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I. INTRODUCTION
The application of antitrust law to the health care field is a
relatively recent phenomenon, because, until recently, the provi-
sion of health services was not even considered to involve inter-
state commerce.1 Antitrust litigation in the health care field is ex-
1. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976). In
Hospital Bldg. Co., plaintiff alleged a conspiracy by defendants to prevent the
construction of plaintiff's hospital. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, en banc, held that such a conspiracy, even if proved, would not
have a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to invoke the federal anti-trust
laws. 511 F.2d 678, 684 (4th Cir. 1975), en banc., rev'd., 425 U.S. 738 (1976). How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court reversed, and held that such an alleged
restraint would substantially affect interstate commerce. 425 U.S. at 739-40. As
the Supreme Court explained,
[t]he complaint, fairly read, alleges that if respondents and their co-
conspirators were to succeed in blocking petitioner's plan of expansion,
petitioner's purchases of out-of-state medicines and supplies as well as
its revenues from out-of-state insurance companies would be thousands
and perhaps hundreds of thousands of dollars less then they would oth-
erwise be. Similarly, the management fees that petitioner pays to its out-
of-state parent corporation would be less if the expansion were blocked.
Moreover, the multi-million dollar financing for the expansion, a large
portion of which would be from out-of-state, would simply not take place
if the respondents succeeded in their alleged scheme. This combination
of factors is certainly sufficient to establish a "substantial effect" on in-
terstate commerce under the Act.
Id. at 744. See also infra notes 206-11, 219-21 and accompanying text.
Although the United States Supreme Court had dealt with restraints on med-
ical and hospital services in 1943, that early case was based on Section 3 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1976), which prohibits restraints of trade in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and, therefore, it was unnecessary to establish a sufficient nexus
with interstate commerce. See American Medical Ass'n. v. United States, 317 U.S.
519, 526 (1943) (affirming convictions of medical societies conspiring to restrain
prepaid medical care by salaried physicians). See generally M.J. THOMPSON, ANTI-
TRUST AND THE HELTH CARE PROVIDER, 1, 15-17 & 21 n.1 (1979). As Thompson
explains, "[t]he dispute addressed by the Supreme Court in American Medical
Assn. v. United States,. . . is the first major instance of applying anti-trust prin-
ciples to health providers. Even after this early case, little activity occurred within
the area for close to 30 years." Id. at 21 n.1.
Today, the dispute over the nexus with interstate commerce most often arises
in cases involving a hospital's denial of medical staff membership and admitting
privileges to an individual physician. Compare Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F.
Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (upholding federal jurisdiction), aff'd., 688 F.2d 824
(3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 302 (1982) with Cardio-Medical Assocs.,
2
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pected to increase in the future, as competition intensifies and
alternative types of providers enter the field. Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court has recently held that the health care field
is subject to per se rules of antitrust liability, rather than the rule
of reason applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.2
In applying antitrust law to the health care field, two develop-
ments can be combined to impose vicarious antitrust liability. The
first of these developments is the imposition of antitrust liability
on the basis of apparent authority, and the second is the applica-
tion of agency theories to the health care field in cases of profes-
sional malpractice. Briefly stated, the agency theories developed in
the negligence area to impose liability on health care institutions
can be applied outside the negligence field to impose vicarious an-
titrust liability on health care institutions.
The United States Supreme Court has recently held that a
nonprofit organization can be held liable for treble damages on a
theory of apparent authority for the acts of its agents, even though
the organization never ratified the activities of its agents and the
agents did not act with an intent to benefit the organization.3 In
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel
Corp.,4 employees of one manufacturer used their positions and
contacts with the nonprofit, standard-setting organization to injure
a competitor, by causing the organization to publish a letter stat-
ing that their competitors' product failed to comply with the or-
ganization's standards. The nonprofit organization was held vicari-
ously liable for treble damages and attorneys' fees on the theory of
apparent authority. Similarly, vicarious antitrust liability on the
basis of apparent authority can be readily applied to the health
care field because of the numerous agency relationships in the
health care marketplace.
Over the past ten years, a great deal of attention has been
given by courts and commentators to hospital liability in negli-
Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 536 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (deny-
ing federal jurisdiction).
2. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982). See
infra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
3. See American Soc'y. of Mechnical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S.
Ct. 1935 (1982).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1942-48.
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gence for the acts of non-employed physicians.6 Modern theories of
corporate liability and agency have been used to impose greater
liability on the hospital entity.7 As both hospitals and personal in-
jury plaintiffs learned in the area of negligence, severe liability can
now be imposed in spite of the traditional independent contractor
relationship between the hospital and its physicians. However,
very little attention has been paid to the hospital's potential liabil-
ity in areas other than negligence for actions taken by non-em-
ployed physicians.
Hospital liability for actions of non-employed physicians is a
function of the agency relationships in the health care field. In his
article on the relationship between the hospital and its medical
staff,' Professor Southwick explained that "the organized medical
staff is an 'agent' of the hospital corporation with a mandate to
effectuate corporate purposes." Similarly, courts have held that
"the members of such [medical] staff act as agents for the [hospital
authority]. . . ."1 This agency relationship between hospitals and
staff physicians invites the application of the Supreme Court's an-
titrust analysis in American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and
raises the possibility of vicarious antitrust liability for the acts of
non-employed physicians.
In the area of negligence, hospitals traditionally avoided liabil-
ity for injuries to patients, because physicians were considered to
be independent contractors rather than agents of the hospital,"1
and the hospital's own duty to patients in the area of patient care
was narrowly construed.1 2 However, during the past twenty or
thirty years, the protective wall around the hospital has been
breached by developments in the law of agency,13 and by the impo-
sition of a duty on hospitals to act affirmatively in monitoring and
supervising patient care.1 4 As two commentators15 recently stated,
6. See infra notes 40 and 100.
7. See infra notes 20-119 and accompanying text.
8. Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities
Change its Relationship With the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 429 (1973).
9. Id. at 437-38.
10. See, e.g., Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 142, 189
S.E.2d 412, 414 (1972).
11. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
15. Zaremski & Spitz, Liability of a Hospital as an Institution: Are the
Walls of Jericho Tumbling?, 16 F. 225 (1981).
[Vol. 5:61
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"a hospital as an entity may no longer be able to hide under the
ambit of independent contractor status of its physicians. Query,
then, whether the Walls of Jericho are still standing."' 6
The decline of the independent contractor defense in negli-
gence cases will not go unnoticed by plaintiffs' attorneys in cases
outside the negligence field. Plaintiffs will borrow modern theories
of hospital liability from the law of negligence, and use those theo-
ries as powerful weapons in actions based on statutory and regula-
tory violations, including the antitrust laws. Hospitals, in turn, will
take concrete steps to protect themselves, just as they did in re-
sponse to increased liability for negligence. For example, the impo-
sition of greater negligence liability on hospitals has caused hospi-
tals to protect themselves by exercising greater control over the
activities of their staff physicians.1 7 Therefore, hospitals need not
be afraid of losing the independent contractor defense in areas
other than negligence. Rather, just as in the past, the imposition of
greater liability will enable the hospital to assert greater control
over its staff physicians, in order to comply with its responsibilities
and protect itself against liabilities.
In order to understand the interface between vicarious anti-
trust liability and the decline of the independent contractor de-
fense in the health care field, it is necessary to understand the
complex relationship between the hospital and the physician, as
well as the recent changes that have taken place in that relation-
ship. Therefore, this article will briefly trace the changes that have
occurred in the traditional rules of the hospital's relationship with
its physicians."8 Then, the current relationship between hospital
and staff physician will be examined in light of legal requirements,
accreditation standards and practical considerations. 9 After a brief
introduction to the health care marketplace as a context for anti-
trust law, the new theories of liability will be applied to the health
care field, in order to give examples of claims likely to be asserted
by plaintiffs and defenses that can be raised by health care
institutions.
16. Id. at 229.
17. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, PHYSiCIANS' LiCENSUli AND DIscIPLINE: THi LEGAL
AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF MEDicAL PRAcTicE, 202, 210 (1979). See gener-
ally, Southwick, supra note 8, at 465-67.
18. See infra notes 20-119 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 120-50 and accompanying text.
1982]
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II. THE CHANGING VIEW OF THE HOSPITAL AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO PHYSICIANS
The traditional view of the hospital was that it was merely a
"workshop" ' for physicians. As one commentator"' explained,
"[tihe hospital was simply a physical place consisting of bricks and
mortar, beds and equipment, where the private practicing physi-
cian found facilities to support his art."22 The nature and function
of the hospital were limited, and, therefore, the hospital's legal du-
ties were limited." Under this traditional view, the hospital did
not have a duty to provide or supervise patient care.24 The lack of
any duty to provide care may be traceable to the historic inability
of a corporation, including a hospital, to practice medicine. 25 Be-
cause the hospital entity could not provide care, it could not con-
trol the provision of care by physicians.2" Moreover, the lack of a
hospital duty to supervise patient care is also based on the tradi-
tional deference paid to the powerful medical profession by both
hospital governing boards and the courts.'1 Whether based on the
20. Southwick, supra note 8 at 434.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
It was formerly accepted that the hospital as an institution played little
or no role with respect to patient care. . . . Accordingly, the legal duties
of the corporation to the patient, even after the removal of charitable
immunity for tort, were limited to an obligation to exercise reasonable
care with respect to the maintenance of buildings and grounds, the
equipment, and in the selection for employment of lay and paramedical
personnel.
Id. Accord, Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 634, 14 S.E.2d 643, 647 (1941)
("Ordinarily, the hospital undertakes only to furnish room, food, facilities for op-
eration, and attendance .... ").
24. See Southwick, supra note 8, at 434. See also supra note 23.
25. See Southwick, supra note 8, at 430-31; Comment, The Hospital-Physi-
cian Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for Malpractice of Physicians, 50
WASH. L. REv. 385, 392 & n.49 (1975). "Many, therefore, viewed the hospital as
two organizations-administrative and medical-each limited by custom, and per-
haps even by a literal application of the corporate practice rule, to their respective
roles and responsibilites." Southwick, supra note 8, at 431.
26. See Southwick, supra note 8, at 431.
27. See, e.g., Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 635, 14 S.E.2d 643, 647
(1941) ("[P]hysicians are not the servants of their employers but are professional
men who 'exercise their profession to the best of their abilities according to their
own discretion . . . .'"). See also Wing & Craige, Health Care Regulation: Di-
lemma of a Partially Developed Public Policy, 57 N.C.L. Rav. 1165, 1168
[Vol. 5:61
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corporate practice rule, professional prestige, or the practical in-
ability of lay administrators to supervise professional performance,
the physician's treatment of his patient was clearly beyond the
control of the hospital. Even employed physicians were often con-
sidered to be beyond the control of the hospital which employed
them."'
This lack of control over physicians, in turn, insulated the hos-
pital from vicarious liability for the physicians' negligence. Under
the tort law doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer or prin-
cipal will only be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employ-
ees or agents, but not for the acts of its independent contractors.2 9
In determining whether a party is an employee or agent, as op-
posed to an independent contractor, courts look at the degree of
control over the manner of performing the work.30 Therefore, the
conclusion that physicians are beyond the control of the hospital
meant that the hospital would not be held liable on grounds of
respondeat superior for the negligence of those physicians.3 ' As
one court explained,
[t]he doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to a
physician who acts upon his own initiative, and in the exercise of
his own judgment and skill, without direction or control of an em-
ployer,... and on the part of a physician who is not the servant
or employee of the hospital, and who is pursuing an independent
calling, the responsibility is not that of the hospital .... "
This legal rule appears to be grounded in fairness as well as tradi-
tion, because it would be inequitable to hold a party liable for the
acts of someone beyond his control, and such vicarious liability
would be ineffective as a deterrent. Therefore, under the tradi-
tional rules, the hospital as an entity was insulated from vicarious
(1979)("Political considerations account for the relative immunity enjoyed by in-
dividual providers.").
A further example of the traditional deference given to professionals is that,
until recently, members of the "learned professions" were thought to be exempt
from the federal antitrust laws. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
787-88 (1975).
28. See, e.g., Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 635, 14 S.E.2d 643, 647
(1941).
29. See W. Pxossma, HANDBooK oF THE LAw oF ToRTs §§ 69-71 (4th ed.
1971).
30. See infra notes 49-67 and accompanying text.
31. See generally F. GRAm & N. MARi, supra note 17, at 201.
32. Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 634, 14 S.E.2d 643, 647 (1941).
19821
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liability for the acts of its physicians by the shield of their inde-
pendent contractor status."3
The changes in these rules which have taken place since the
1950's have been attributed to various social needs and phenom-
ena. One commentator s noted the role of the hospital entity as a
potential "deep pocket" to compensate the injured patient where
his damages exceeded the individual physician's liability insur-
ance."' In contrast, others have concluded that the changes in legal
rules resulted from the recognition that the hospital was more than
a mere workshop. 6 For example, in Bing v. Thunig,7 the Court of
Appeals of New York concluded that the old conception of the
hospital was no longer realistic:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the
patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses,
but undertakes simply to procure them to act upon their own re-
sponsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as
their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than
furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary
basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and interns, as well as ad-
ministrative and manual workers, and they charge patients for
medical care and treatment, collecting for such services, if neces-
sary, by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of
'hospital facilities' expects that the hospital will attempt to cure
him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on their own
responsibility."
33. In addition, hospitals often had a charitable immunity. See Bost v. Riley,
44 N.C. App. 638, 645, 262 S.E.2d 391, 395, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 194, 269 S.E.2d
621 (1980). See also Southwick, supra note 8, at 434.
34. Payne, Recent Developments Affecting a Hospital's Liability for Negli-
gence of Physicians, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 389, 389 (1977).
35. Id.
36. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 17, at 202-03. See also Southwick, supra
note 8, at 434 ("In actual fact the practice of medicine has been institutional-
ized.") According to Southwick, the physician and the hospital are mutually de-
pendent. Id. at 466.
37. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
38. Id. at 666, 143 N.E.2d at 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
Similarly, "[i]n abolishing the doctrine of charitable immunity, formerly
available to charitable hospitals as a defense to negligence actions in North Caro-
lina, Justice (later Chief Justice) Sharp acknowledged the changed structure of
the modern hospital. . . ." Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 645, 262 S.E.2d 391,
395, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 194, 269 S.E.2d 621 (1980) (citing Rabon v. Hospital,
269 N.C. 1, 11, 152 S.E.2d 485, 492 (1967)).
[Vol. 5:61
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Therefore, in recognition of new circumstances-or perhaps preex-
isting circumstances that had been conveniently ignored-the old
rules of the hospital's limited role and the physicians' independent
contractor status began to change.
The old rules obviously did not change all at once, but rather
in a series of stages. In analyzing the changes as well as the limita-
tions on those changes, a fundamental distinction must be made.
On one hand, a hospital may be held vicariously liable on grounds
of respondeat superior for the acts of its physicians. On the other
hand, a hospital may be held liable for its own failure to exercise
reasonable care in fulfilling its own duties. This distinction is anal-
ogous to the situation of a trucking company which can be held
vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee driver, as well
as for its own negligence in failing to exercise reasonable care in
hiring, training or supervising its employee. In addition, there is an
important distinction between vicarious liability for the acts of an
actual agent and vicarious liability, on principles akin to estoppel,
for the acts of an apparent or ostensible agent."'
A. Hospital Liability Where the Negligent Party Was Actually
an Agent of the Hospita40
Among the first steps in changing the traditional rules in
agency cases were the holdings in Bing4 and similar cases4' that a
hospital would be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its em-
ployee physicians and nurses, even if the physician's or nurse's act
was characterized as "medical" or "professional" rather than
merely "administrative." 8 This development made the field of
hospital liability more consistent with the general tort concepts of
39. See Southwick, supra note 8, at 452.
40. See generally, Southwick, supra note 8, at 452; Slawkowski, Do the
Courts Understand the Realities of Hospital Practices?, 22 ST. Loins U.L.J. 452,
455 (1978); Annot., 69 A.L.R. 2d 305 (1960 & Supp. 1980).
41. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
42. See e.g. Waynick v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 120, 72 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1952)
(Duke University Hospital would be vicariously liable for the negligence of a sala-
ried resident).
43. Southwick, supra note 8, at 452; Stromberg, Corporate Hospital Liability
and Responsibility for Health Care, in CRMcAL ISSUES IN HEALTH LAW, 16 (1978).
But see Comment, supra note 25, at 392 n.50 (Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18
Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972) applied the rejected doctrine of distinguish-
ing administrative acts from medical acts, because of the court's confusion in at-
tempting to apply the control test).
19821
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vicarious liability for the acts of employees. However, in accor-
dance with general rules of tort liability, a hospital would not be
liable for the acts of physicians who were independent contractors
rather than employees.
After courts began to hold that a hospital could be vicariously
liable for the negligent "medical" acts of its employees, including
physicians and nurses, the borrowed servant doctrine took on
added significance. Under the borrowed servant doctrine, an inde-
pendent contractor physician temporarily makes the hospital's
nurse or employed physician" his own agent rather than the hospi-
tal's agent. Under those circumstances, the negligence of the "bor-
rowed" nurse or employed physician will be imputed only to the
"borrowing" physician as his or her temporary master."' When a
hospital was not held liable for the professional acts of its em-
ployee physicians and nurses, it made little difference whether the
hospital's employees were borrowed by an independent contractor,
or, alternatively, remained the servants of the hospital. However,
once a hospital could be held liable for its employees' professional
acts, it was crucial to determine whether the doctor or the hospital
was the master for purposes of vicarious liability. Eventually, how-
ever, courts began to reject the borrowed servant doctrine.46
Since the rejection of the borrowed servant doctrine and the
distinction between "professional" acts and "administrative"
acts,4 7 the rules in health care agency cases have been consistent
with cases outside the health care field. Thus, a hospital will be
held vicariously liable on grounds of respondeat superior if the
44. It is not clear whether the borrowed servant doctrine applied to employed
physicians as well as employed nurses. However, the rationale of the doctrine ap-
parently applies to residents assisting in surgery and possibly to an anesthesiolo-
gist as well.
45. Southwick, supra note 8, at 442.
Sometimes a private physician (an independent contractor) will tem-
porarily "borrow" a hospital employee to direct with respect to a given
task. If the doctor's ability to control the doing of the task is readily
visible, a court may apply the Borrowed Servant Doctrine, thereby ren-
dering the physician vicariously liable for any negligence of his tempo-
rary employee, and perhaps insulating the hospital from liability.
Id. (footnote omitted).
46. Id. at 442, 452. "Recent cases, especially litigation involving erroneous
sponge counts by surgical nurses, indicate a demise of or a judicial reluctance to
apply the Borrowed Servant Doctrine. Hence, the liability (vicarious) is the hospi-
tal's and not the doctor's .... " Id. at 442 (footnote omitted).
47. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 5:61
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negligent physician is an employee or agent, but not if the physi-
cian is an independent contractor."s However, although the formal
rule structure comports with negligence cases in other industries,
there are unique problems in applying the doctrine of respondeat
superior in the health care field. Specifically, the attempt to apply
the control test as the determinant of independent contractor sta-
tus leads to confusion when applied to the right of lay hospital
administrators and trustees to control a physician's treatment of
his patient in the hospital."'
According to one court,50 the legal standard for independent
contractor status is whether the alleged employer "assumes the
right to control the time, manner and method of executing the
work, as distinguished from the right merely to require certain def-
inite results in conformity to the contract."5 1 Does this mean that a
physician is always an independent contractor, because the lay
hospital administrator cannot direct the physician in the perform-
ance of an operation or require him to prescribe a particular medi-
cation? Or is a physician always sufficiently controlled to be an
agent or employee of the hospital, because he is required to comply
with the rules and regulations of the hospital as to privileges, con-
sultations and committee reviews?"2 Courts appear to have taken
both of these extreme positions. For example, in Mduba v. Bene-
dictine Hospital,5 the court held that because the emergency
room physician was required to comply with the rules of the hospi-
tal board, he "was controlled by the defendant hospital as to the
means or manner of achieving this result."" Similarly, in Beeck v.
48. See, e.g., Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 1M. App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d
198 (1979); Waynick v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 120, 72 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1952). See also
Horty & Mullholland, The Legal Status of the Hospital Medical Staff, 22 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 485, 491 n.28 (1978) ("Generally, courts readily have imposed liabil-
ity on hospitals under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the negligent medi-
cal acts of employee physicians.").
There is a separate requirement that the employee or agent must be operat-
ing within the scope of his employment or agency. See James v. Holder, 34 A.D.2d
632, 309 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1970); Waynick v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4
(1952); Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 14 S.E.2d 643 (1941).
49. Comment, supra note 25, at 392-94 (control test does not work because
control by laymen is impractical and illegal.)
50. Hodges v. Doctors' Hosp., 141 Ga. App. 649, 234 S.E.2d 116 (1977).
51. Id. at 651, 234 S.E.2d at 117.
52. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
53. 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1976).
54. Id. at 452, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
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Tucson General Hospital,55 the court looked at many factors in-
cluding the fact that "the hospital could regulate operation of its
x-ray department to the extent of requiring that the descent-ar-
resting stop be in place before undertaking the type of procedure
in question here."' However, a contrary interpretation of the con-
trol test was taken in Beck v. Lovell,57 which held that the hospital
would not be liable for a surgeon's acts on the basis of respondeat
superior, because there was no showing that the hospital had any
control of the surgeon or the manner of performing surgery.6
Moreover, in Overstreet v. Doctors' Hospital," the court held that
where the hospital had no right to control the specific techniques
used by the emergency room physicians, but could merely monitor
the quality of the work, the physicians were independent contrac-
tors, notwithstanding the hospital's control of matters other than
the method of treatment.60 As indicated by these conflicting deci-
sions, the control test yields neither reasoned nor consistent solu-
tions when applied to physicians in hospitals." As one court'2 con-
cluded, "hornbook rules of agency" do not apply, and the
relationship is sui generis." Commentators have reached the same
conclusion." As one commentator" explained, because the control
test does not work in this context, courts speak of control, but ac-
tually ignore the issue of control in favor of a tacit analysis of the
55. 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972).
56. Id. at 170, 500 P.2d at 1158.
57. 361 So. 2d 245 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
58. Id. at 252.
59. 142 Ga. App. 895, 237 S.E.2d 213 (1977).
60. Id. at 897, 237 S.E.2d at 215.
61. See supra note 49.
62. Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978).
63. Id. at 105, 579 P.2d at 974.
64. Southwick, supra note 8, at 465; Comment, supra note 25, at 392-94.
Placing the doctor in the legal status as an "employee" or as a "servant"
is not necessarily inconsistent with a professional's clinical freedom to-
possess and exercise independent skill and judgment. To be sure, the
traditional legal definition of an employee is that he or she is an individ-
ual subject to the master's right to control the means and methods of the
performance of the employee's work. But in both English and American
decisions the courts have departed from traditional definitior - in hospi-
tal liability cases. In short, professional individuals are deemed to be
employees even though the practice of their professional work is not in
fact subject to detailed control by lay hospital administrators.
Southwick, supra note 8, at 465 (emphasis added).
65. Comment, supra note 25, at 392-94.
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relations between hospital and patient and between hospital and
physician, such as whether the physician was on salary at the hos-
pital.66 If the physician receives a salary from the hospital, then he
will be deemed to be an employee, and the hospital will be held
vicariously liable. 7
Determining whether a negligent physician is the agent of a
hospital for purposes of respondeat superior is much more difficult
if the physician does not receive a salary from the hospital. 6 In
general, a physician in private practice who merely has staff privi-
leges at the hospital will not be considered an agent or employee of
the hospital.6 9 "Courts consider it irrelevant that a physician has
'staff privileges' at a hospital, since such privileges merely permit
the physician to use the hospital for his or her private patients. ' 70
However, a court may look at the facts of a particular case to de-
termine whether a physician is an independent contractor' 1 and
the evidence may be sufficient to raise a jury question as to the
physician's status in some cases.72
66. Id. According to that commentator, salary is the only significant factor of
the hospital/physician relation. Id.
67. See, e.g., Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 IlL App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d
198 (1979); Waynick v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952) (salaried assis-
tant resident was an agent, servant and employee).
68. See Horty and Mulholland, supra note 48, at 491 n.28 ("Whether the
physician's status is that of an independent contractor with staff privileges at a
hospital or of an actual employee of the hospital often may be unclear, however,
due to the various methods of paying physicians and the various levels of staff
privileges commonly granted in hospitals.").
69. Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz. App. 413, 417, 533 P.2d 721, 725 (1975) (staff
privileges do not necessarily make the doctor an employee); Cooper v. Curry, 92
N.M. 417, 419, 589 P.2d 201, 203 (1978); Jeffcoat v. Phillips, 534 S.W.2d 168, 173
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976) ("[A] doctor of the choice of a patient is still considered by
a majority of states to be an 'independent contractor' with regard to hospitals at
which he has staff privileges.").
70. Cooper v. Curry, 92 N.M. 417, 419, 589 P.2d 201, 203 (1978). See also,
Zaremski & Spitz, supra note 15, at 228-29. "Even if the physician is a member of
a hospital's medical staff, he is generally held to be an independent contractor if
he does not receive a regular salary from the hospital, maintains a private prac-
tice, and if he is directly chosen by the patient ... ." Id. (footnote omitted).
71. Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz. App. 413, , 533 P.2d 721, 725 (1975).
72. See e.g., Hodges v. Doctors' Hosp., 141 Ga. App. 649, 653, 234 S.E.2d 116,
118 (1977).
Procedurally, when the defendant hospital files a motion for summary judg-
ment on the ground that the allegedly negligent physician is an independent con-
tractor, supported by the hospital administrator's affidavit disclaiming control, it
is perilous for the plaintiff patient to fail to respond with evidence sufficient to
1982]
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In contrast to physicians in private practice with admitting
privileges, specialists such as radiologists, anesthesiologists and
emergency room physicians may be held to be employees or agents
of the hospital even without receiving a salary from the hospital.
For example, in Beeck 73 the court held that the radiologist was an
employee of the hospital, notwithstanding contractual provisions
to the contrary, where he and his associates operated the hospital's
radiology department under an exclusive contract, with payment
based on a percentage of income from the x-ray department rather
than a salary.7 ' Similarly, the court in Kober v. Stewart" held that
the radiologist might be an agent of the hospital because the con-
tract might have been a means of hiring a supervisor for the hospi-
tal's x-ray department.76 There are analogous cases involving anes-
thesiologists." Finally, emergency room physicians may also be
held to be agents or employees of the hospital. 6
In conclusion, the nonsalaried physician with staff privileges
will probably not be held to be an agent or employee of the hospi-
tal, although specialists under contract to perform certain hospital
make out a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Badeaux v. East Jefferson
Gen. Hosp., 364 So.2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
73. Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972).
74. Id. at 169-71, 500 P.2d at 1158. See Southwick, supra note 8, at 442-43.
"Of major significance in Beech was that recitals in the contract between the hos-
pital and the medical specialists that the latter are to be considered independent
contractors did not prevent the court from finding otherwise." Id. at 443 (footnote
omitted).
75. 148 Mont. 117, 417 P.2d 476 (1966).
76. Id. at 123, 417 P.2d at 479.
77. Compare Garcia v. Tarrio, 380 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (per
curiam) (sufficient evidence of agency) with Holzberg v. Flower and Fifth Ave.
Hosp., 39 A.D.2d 526, 330 N.Y.S.2d 682, affd without op., 32 N.Y.2d 716, 344
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1973) (anesthetist was independent contractor).
78. See, e.g., Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527
(1976); Rucker v. High Point Memorial Hosp., Inc., 20 N.C. App. 650, 202 S.E.2d
610 (1974), aff'd, 285 N.C. 519, 206 S.E.2d 196 (1974) (contract for emergency
room doctors established an employer-employee relation where they lacked ad-
mitting privileges, worked full-time and had no private practice); Adamaki v. Ta-
coma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978) (nonsalaried emergency
room physicians might have really been agents of the hospital because plaintiff
went to the emergency room and had no choice of doctor, and because the physi-
cians performed "an inherent function of the hospital") (quoting Beeck v. Tucson
Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972)). But see Overstreet v. Doc-
tors' Hosp., 142 Ga. App. 895, 237 S.E.2d 213 (1977) (emergency room physicians
were not employees); Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 399
N.E.2d 198 (1979) (no vicarious liability for acts of emergency room physician).
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functions will often be held to be agents or employees. It can be
argued that a physician with staff privileges should be deemed to
be the agent of the hospital in light of the current organizational
and administrative structure of the hospital and its medical staff.79
However, courts seldom analyze the nature and organization of the
modern hospital or its medical staff in making decisions on agency
status. Moreover, courts may avoid holding that all staff physicians
are agents in order to avoid imposing liability on the hospital for
every negligent act of every member of its medical staff.8s
B. Hospital Liability Where the Negligent Party Was the Ap-
parent or Ostensible Agent of the Hospital
Even if a physician is not the agent of the hospital, as between
the physician and the hospital, courts may treat the physician as
the hospital's agent on the ground that the hospital deceived the
patient into believing that he was being treated by an agent of the
hospital.81 The doctrine of apparent agency as a basis for imposing
vicarious liability in tort is not a new or controversial concept.82
Moreover, courts have recognized its application in the health care
field for at least forty years.88 As explained in Seneris v. Haas,"
there are three elements required to establish ostensible agency:
An agency is ostensible when the principal intentionally, or by
want of ordinary care, causes a third person to believe another to
be his agent who is not really employed by him .... Before a
79. See infra notes 120-51 and accompanying text.
80. See Note, Hospital Corporate Liability: An Effective Solution to Con-
trolling Private Physician Incompetence?, 32 RUTGERS L. Rxv. 342, 359 (1979).
"It appears unlikely, therefore, that courts would expand the theory of respondeat
superior to provide a basis on which hospitals are found liable for the malpractice
of the independent private physician members of its medical staff." Id. at 359
(footnote omitted).
81. See, e.g., Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp., 404 Mich. 240, 250-52, 273
N.W.2d 429, 433-34 (1978) (degree of control exercised by hospital is irrelevant);
Mduba v. Benedictine Hoop., 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1976); Shagrin v.
Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 304 A.2d 61 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973). See also
Horty & Mulholland, supra note 48, at 491 n.28; Southwick, supra note 8, at 452.
82. See W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 70, at 467.
83. See, e.g., Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 54 Cal. App.
2d 141, 128 P.2d 705 (1942); Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 635, 14 S.E.2d
643, 648 (1941) (hospital not liable on ground of apparent authority in absence of
evidence, inter alia, that doctor was "held out by the [hospital] as having been
employed by it to treat pay patients").
84. 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
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recovery can be had against a principal for the alleged acts of an
ostensible agent, three things must be proved, to-wit . . .(First)
The person dealing with the agent must do so with belief in the
agent's authority and this belief must be a reasonable one; (sec-
ond) such belief must be generated by some act or neglect of the
principal sought to be charged; (third) and the third person in
relying on the agent's apparent authority must not be guilty of
negligence. 85
Although the courts look at various factors in determining
whether there is an ostensible agency, the fundamental inquiry is
whether the hospital "held out" the physician as its agent,"
thereby estopping the hospital from denying an agency relation-
ship.8 = For example, in Shagrin v. Wilmington Medical Center,
Inc.,8s the court held that there were issues of fact as to both the
actual relationship of the hospital to the emergency room physi-
cians and the hospital's representation to the public that the emer-
gency room was part of the hospital. 89 The court in Shagrin held
that, especially where there is a holding-out, the hospital can be
liable for the acts of "independent contractors performing medical
services ordinarily performed by the hospital."90 The significance
of "performing medical services ordinarily performed by the hospi-
tal"'° is not entirely clear, because courts appear to consider it as
having a significance even beyond its effect in misleading the pa-
tient. Rather, courts in ostensible agency cases appear to analyze
the relationships between patient and physician and between pa-
tient and hospital in order to determine whose treatment the pa-
tient sought." For example, in Grewe v. Mt. Clemens General
Hospital,9" the court held that a physician with staff privileges
85. Id. at 831, 291 P.2d at 927 (quoting Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of
Chiropractic, 54 Cal. App. 2d 141, 146, 128 P.2d 705, 708 (1942) and Hill v. Citi-
zens Nat. Trust & Say. Bank, 9 Cal. 2d 172, 176, 69 P.2d 853, 855 (1937)).
86. Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1976).
87. See, eg., Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp., 404 Mich. 240, 250-52, 273
N.W.2d 429, 433-34 (1978). See also Horty & Mulholland, supra note 48, at 491
n.28 ("[Tihe hospital may be held to be estopped from claiming that the physi-
cian is not an employee where a plaintiff patient applied directly to the hospital
for treatment and the hospital provided the services of a physician.").
88. 304 A.2d 61 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973).
89. Id. at 64.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
93. 404 Mich. 240, 273 N.W.2d 429 (1978).
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would be the agent of the hospital if the patient sought treatment
from the hospital and the hospital provided a physician for the
patient.94 Under those circumstances, there would be no indepen-
dent doctor-patient relation, and, therefore, the patient would not
view the hospital as the place where his own doctor treats him.95
Although the patient in Grewe had no reason to know that the
physician was an independent contractor rather than an em-
ployee," the court stated in dictum that the hospital might be lia-
ble despite that knowledge on the part of the patient.97 Therefore,
ostensible agency may encompass a functional analysis of the pa-
tient's relationships as well as the more traditional analysis of a
"holding-out" by the hospital. The traditional "holding-out" the-
ory of ostensible agency is based on the obvious unfairness of sub-
jecting an injured party to secret limitations on the authority of an
apparent agent," and on the desire to place the loss on the party
94. Id. at 251, 273 N.W.2d at 433.
95. Id. at 250-51, 273 N.W.2d at 433.
96. Id. at 253, 273 N.W.2d at 434.
97. Id. at 255, 273 N.W.2d at 435. In addition, the court in Grewe cited
Shagrin v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 304 A.2d 61 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973)
and stated that vicarious liability should be applied where independent contrac-
tors perform "medical services ordinarily performed by the hospital." 404 Mich.
at 251-52, 273 N.W.2d at 433.
98. See, e.g., Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153
(1972) (radiologist was really the hospital's agent, notwithstanding a contract to
the contrary). See supra note 74. Although Beech was not based on ostensible
agency, the concept of fairness is the same. Southwick, supra note 8, at 452.
Moreover, the Beech court refused to give effect to the patient's acceptance of the
independent contractor relationship in a hospital consent form. As Southwick
explains,
[t]he court further held that a "Conditions of Admissions" form signed
by the patient whereby she purportedly agreed to such an independent
contractor relationship, and acknowledged that the radiologist was not
an employee of the hospital, was of no legal effect. To be sure, in Beech,
the patient was a native of Germany who was handicapped in her under-
standing of the English language, this being one reason the court disre-
garded the contractual language. However, it is believed that the result
would be the same. were there no language barrier chiefly because the
bargaining power of the parties in the hospital setting is so grossly
unequal.
Id. at 443 (footnotes omitted).
Arguably, recitations in a consent form would have greater significance in
cases of ostensible agency than in cases of actual agency, because ostensible
agency doctrine often relies on the patient's knowledge rather than the reality of
the hospital-physician relationship. Nevertheless, such clauses in consent forms
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whose "holding-out" made the loss possible. However, a "holding-
out" analysis is often somewhat superficial, in that the patient
probably did not change his position or consent to treatment in
reliance on the hospital's representation to him that a physician
was its agent. Therefore, it is awkward to attempt to apply a clas-
sic estoppel theory. For this reason, the functional analysis of the
patient's relationships with the hospital and the physician is a val-
uable addition to ostensible agency theory. Moreover, although
courts use the language of reliance and estoppel, they might be us-
ing the doctrine of ostensible agency in order to force the hospital
to bear and distribute the loss.99
C. Hospital Liability for Its Own Negligence
Aside from vicarious liability on grounds of respondeat supe-
rior for the negligence of its actual or ostensible agents, a hospital
can also be held liable for its own negligence, which is often re-
ferred to as "corporate liability."100 "In contrast to the vicarious
nature of respondeat superior, the doctrine of 'corporate negli-
gence' involves the violation of a duty owed directly by the hospi-
tal to the patient."10' A hospital always had a duty to its pa-
tients. 02 However, as explained above, 03 in accordance with the
traditional nature of the hospital as a mere "workshop," the hospi-
tal's duty was limited to such areas as providing safe facilities, and
the hospital did not have a duty to provide or supervise patient
care. ' Therefore, as the court explained in the landmark case of
should be ignored by the courts, because they do not indicate knowledge or un-
derstanding on the part of the patient. It is interesting to note that the Patient's
Bill of Rights of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals provides
that the patient has the right to know the professional relationships of those who
treat him. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, Accreditation Manual
for Hospitals: 1982 Edition, xiv (1981) [hereinafter JCAH]. See infra notes 128-39
and accompanying text.
99. See also infra note 112.
100. See generally Stromberg, supra note 43; Zaremski and Spitz, supra note
15; Note, supra note 80; Southwick, supra note 8; Comment, Piercing the Doc-
trine of Corporate Hospital Liability, 17 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 383 (1980); Annot.,
13 A.L.R. 3d 873 (1967 & Supp. 1980).
101. Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 645, 262 S.E.2d 391, 395, cert. denied,
300 N.C. 194, 269 S.E.2d 621 (1980).
102. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 5:61
18
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss1/2
VICARIOUS ANTITRUST LIABILITY
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,10 5 the rela-
tively recent recognition of a hospital's duty in regard to patient
care is really an issue of "the standard of conduct required to sat-
isfy the duty," because "the duty is always the same .. . ."I" As
with changes in the application of agency doctrines," 7 the corpo-
rate liability doctrine resulted, at least in part, from a recognition
of the changed nature of the modern hospital. 1'08
Although the precise facts and holding of Darling are un-
clear,'0" Darling is generally identified with the corporate liability
doctrine, under which the hospital's duty to its patient requires
the hospital to supervise the provision of all patient care within
the hospital, including the care provided by physicians acknowl-
edged to be independent contractors. In Darling, the court held
that a hospital could be liable for failing to provide enough trained
employees or for failing to require a physician to consult with a
specialist or to review the physician's treatment of the patient. 10
Other courts have held that a hospital will be liable on the ground
of corporate liability for negligently admitting an incompetent
physician to staff membership,"' and negligently permitting a
105. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
106. Id. at 331, 211 N.E.2d at 256-57 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 331 (3d ed. 1964)).
107. See supra notes 34-48 and accompanying text.
108. See Darling, 33 III. 2d at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 257 (citing Bing v. Thunig,
2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957)); Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App.
638, 645, 262 S.E.2d 391, 395 cert. denied, 300 N.C. 194, 269 S.E.2d 621 (1980)
("In contrast, today's hospitals regulate their medical staffs to a much greater
degree and play a much more active role in furnishing patients medical
treatment.").
109. Although Darling is almost always cited as a case of corporate liability,
the court in Collins v. Westlake Community Hosp., 12 II. App. 3d 847, 299
N.E.2d 326 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 57 Ill. 2d 388, 312 N.E.2d 614 (1974),
stated that Darling dealt with a physician employed by the hospital. Id. at 851,
299 N.E.2d at 328.
110. Darling, 33 Ill. 2d at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258. Accord, Bost v. Riley, 44
N.C. App. 638, 647, 262 S.E.2d 391, 396, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 194, 269 S.E.2d
621 (1980) ("[lit seems axiomatic that the hospital have the duty assigned by the
Darling Court to make a reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the treatment
which is prescribed and administered by physicians practicing at the facility.").
Darling arguably involves an element of vicarious liability in that the hospital
is held liable for the failure of its nurses and administrators to provide and super-
vise care. However, the significance of Darling appears to be the recognition that
the hospital entity will violate its corporate duty by failing to meet its own stan-
dard of conduct.
111. Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307
1982]
19
Harris: Vicarious Antitrust Liability in the Health Care Field
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1982
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
known incompetent to practice medicine in the hospital.'12
How can the hospital fulfill its duties under Darling to review
a physician's treatment of a patient and keep incompetent physi-
cians off its medical qtaff?. For both practical and legal reasons,
these supervisory duties must be delegated to licensed medical
professionals.11 3 In practice, a hospital delegates these duties to its
medical staff,114 and the medical staff acts as an agent of the hospi-,
tal in carrying out those duties.1 6 This delegation of authority
from the hospital to the medical staff is significant for several rea-
sons. First, the possibility of delegation eliminates any excuse by
the hospital that it is legally unable to perform its duty to super-
vise treatment."' The hospital cannot avoid its duty by the excuse
(1971), aff'd, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972).
112. 229 Ga. at 142-43, 189 S.E.2d at 414. Accord, Corleto v. Shore Memorial
Hosp., 138 N.J. Super, 302, 307, 350 A.2d 534, 537 (1975) ("placing an incompe-
tent in a position to do harm.").
However, some courts have held that the corporate negligence doctrine
should not be extended to cases based on a lack of informed consent. See, e.g.,
Cooper v. Curry, 92 N.M. 417, 589 P.2d 201 (1978); Cox v. Haworth, 54 N.C. App.
328, 283 S.E.2d 392 (1981).
Questions have been raised as to whether the doctrine of corporate liability
should be retained as a separate theory in addition to the doctrine of vicarious
liability. For example, one commentator has concluded that the two doctrines of
respondeat superior and corporate negligence have merged as a result of the de-
sire to impose liability on the institutional provider of health care. Southwick,
supra note 8, at 452. Moreover, there is often an overlapping area of liability in-
volving both doctrines. For example, a failure of the hospital's medical staff, as
agent of the hospital, to properly supervise patient care is both the negligence of
the hospital's agent for purposes of respondeat superior and the hospital's own
negligence in failing to carry out its own duty of oversight.
113. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
114. See JCAH, supra note 98, at 55. "The governing body shall delegate to
the medical staff the authority to evaluate the professional competence of staff
members and applicants for clinical privileges. Such delegation, however, does not
relieve the governing body of its responsibility for appointing members of the
medical staff." Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 138-39.
115. According to the RESTATEMrNT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958),
"[algency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and consent by the other so to act." See also BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 59
(5th ed. 1979) (an agent is "[a] person authorized by another to act for him
."). See also infra note 118.
116. For example, in Darling, the hospital argued on appeal that the trial
court should have instructed the jury that only a doctor can practice medicine.
The appellate court, however, upheld the trial court's instruction. 33 IlL 2d at
338-39, 211 N.E.2d at 261.
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that it is legally unable to perform a task itself, but rather the hos-
pital must meet its duty by delegating the performance of the re-
quired task. A second significant aspect of delegation is that the
hospital entity remains liable, notwithstanding its delegation of
performance to the medical staff.11 Thus, the hospital is still re-
sponsible for both the quality of care and the conduct of its profes-
sional agents in supervising that care.118 Finally, the delegation of
supervisory authority to the medical staff, as agent for the hospi-
tal's governing board, has caused fundamental changes in the
structure of the modern hospital, as explained in detail below.119
III. THE EFFECT OF THE NEW NEGLIGENCE RULES ON THE
STRUCTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOSPITAL AND
PHYSICIAN
As stated above, the changes in tort law resulted, at least in
part, from changes in the nature and operation of the hospital, or
perhaps from a belated recognition of its preexisting nature and
operation.120 These changes in the law of negligence, in turn,
caused profound changes in the structure of the modern hospital
and its relations with physicians."' The threat of financial liability
for failure to properly supervise physicians' treatment in the hospi-
tal caused hospitals to exercise greater supervision and control
over physicians.1"' As two commentators explained,
[t]he consequence of Darling and the many cases that fol-
lowed it has been to require hospitals to protect themselves
against medical malpractice claims by exercising far greater care
and control not only over staff physicians hired by the hospital
117. See supra note 114. See also infra note 118 and text accompanying note
139.
118. See Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d
307 (1971), affd, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972). "[T]he delegation of the
authority to screen applicants for staff membership on the medical staff does not
relieve the [Hospital Authority] of its responsibility, since the members of such
staff act as agent for the [Hospital Authority] .... " 229 Ga. at 142, 189 S.E.2d
at 414.
119. See infra notes 120-51 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
121. See Southwick, supra note 8, at 434 ("[T]he author's contention is that
expanding rights of the patient vis-a-vis the hospital dictate a new relationship
between the hospital and the private physician, which in turn will affect the pa-
tient-physician relationship in ways yet to be clarified.") (footnote omitted).
122. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 17, at 202, 210.
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but also over those who are granted the privilege of treating pa-
tients in the hospital and using its facilities."'
The hospital's exercise of greater control over physicians required
changes in the roles played by the hospital's governing body, ad-
ministrators and medical staff. ' Moreover, as might be expected,
the changes in traditional roles have lead to anxiety and insecu-
rity.125 Commentators have also concluded that the traditional
view of the hospital, which distinguished between lay hospital
functions and professional medical functions, has given way to a
newer view of the hospital as a single institution under the control
of the governing board. " As one commentator explained the effect
of Darling on hospital organization,
[iut will have a very significant effect upon the management of
many community hospitals because it demands that fragmenta-
tion within the walls of the institution be minimized. In other
words, the historical separation between lay hospital administra-
tion, on one hand, and the clinical practice of medicine, on the
123. Id. at 202 (footnote omitted).
124. See JCAH, supra note 98, at xii.
It is a fact that hospital governing bodies are responsible for the overall
conduct of the hospital in a manner consonant with the hospital's objec-
tive to delivering a high-quality of patient care. A clear statement to this
effect should serve to dispel any confusion and to establish a sound basis
for a realistic and workable set of relationships among the governing
body, the hospital administration, and the medical staff. While these in-
ternal relationships are in the process of development and adjustment, it
is essential that the responsibility of the hospital's governing body be
stated, that the essential role of the chief executive officer acting on be-
half of the governing body be recognized, that the role of the medical
staff be stated, and that conflicting lines of authority and communication
be avoided.
Id.
125. Rourke, Medical Staff Organization, in THE MEDICAL STAFF IN THE
MODERN HOSPITAL, 9 (C. Eisele, ed. 1967). "The administrator, often caught be-
tween the board and the staff, keeps his antacid bottle filled and handy and hopes
that some day he may understand it all." Id.
126. Horty & Mulholland, supra note 48, at 487-88; Southwick, supra note 8,
at 430, 443, 453, 466-67; Southwick, Legal Aspects of Medical Staff Function, in
THE MEDICAL STAFF IN THE MODERN HOSPITAL, 82 (C. Eisele, ed. 1967). Although
the hospital administration, rather than the governing board, controls the daily
operations of the hospital, the administration is accountable to the governing
board, just as the medical staff is accountable to the governing board. See JCAH,
supra note 98 at 55, 93.
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other, is clearly deemphasized, if not abolished. 2 7
However, courts may not adopt the concept of the hospital as a
unified entity, because of their reluctance to infringe on the free-
dom of staff physicians in their practices outside the hospital, as
well as their reluctance to impose liability on the hospital for all
torts and statutory violations by medical staff members.
The current relationship between hospital and physician, as a
matter of organizational dynamics, results from the interaction of
various legal requirements, professional standards and practical
considerations. The interaction of these legal and practical factors
is illustrated by the accreditation standards of the Joint Commis-
sion on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH).12 8 These accreditation
standards play an important role in federal law as a method of
compliance with the conditions of participation in the Medicare
and Medicaid programs. 29 Although the JCAH standards set forth
in the Accreditation Manual for Hospital (AMH) are technically
voluntary, hospitals must comply with these standards as a practi-
cal matter. 3 ' The JCAH standards, therefore, can be viewed as a
blueprint of hospital organization.' 31
The accreditation standards of the JCAH require the hospital
to have an organized governing body with "overall responsibility
127. Southwick, supra note 126, at 82.
128. See F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 17, at 203-04; JCAH, supra note
98, at x.
129. See F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 17, at 203-04; JCAH, supra note
98, at x. As Grad and Marti explain, Congress gave JCAH standards "the practi-
cal force of law" by the enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, be-
cause the requirements for a provider to participate in those programs can be
satisfied by state agency certification or by JCAH accreditation. F. GRAD & N.
M ATI, supra note 17, at 203-04. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (1976); 42 C.F.R. §
405.1901 (1981). However, there have been various formulations of the degree of
federal review of this method of deemed compliance. See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg.
74,826, 74,826-33 (1980). See generally, Jonas, Measurement and Control of the
Quality of Health Care, in HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES, 387-88
(S. Jonas, ed. 1977).
In addition, many state hospital licensure laws are based on the standards
issued by the precurser to the JCAH. M. ROEMER & J. FRIEDMAN, DOCTORS IN
HOSPITALS: MEDICAL STAFF ORGANIZATION AND HOSPITAL PERFORMANCE, 36-40
(1971).
130. See supra note 129.
131. In addition, the JCAH standards require the governing board to enact
certain policies, see, e.g., id. at 56, and adopt certain bylaws, see, e.g., JCAH,
supra note 98, at 51, 56.
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for the conduct of the hospital . . "" In addition, the hospital
must have an "organized medical staff that has the overall respon-
sibility for the quality of all medical care . . .as well as for ac-
counting therefor to the governing body." 13 3 Under JCAH require-
ments, "only a member of the medical staff with admitting
privileges shall admit patients to the hospital . . . ."I" Moreover,
the organized medical staff operates under bylaws which must con-
form to hospital policy and legal requirements,1 5 and which have
the dual function of providing for self-government of the medical
staff and regulating the staff's relationship with the hospital. 3
The staff's relationship with the hospital is not limited to matters
of patient care. Rather, medical staff bylaws must include "a for-
mal means for medical staff participation in the development of
hospital policy relative to both hospital management and patient
care."137 Finally, the JCAH standards clarify that, although the
governing body must delegate the authority to judge physicians'
performance to the medical staff,138 the governing body retains re-
sponsibility for staff appointments. 139
As a matter of organizational dynamics, the control of physi-
cians' performance, which is delegated to the medical staff,14 0 is
accomplished by several mechanisms. First, admission to staff
membership is strictly controlled, as is advancement to higher
levels of privileges. " Second, even for physicians with full privi-
leges, there are conditions, rules and regulations on such matters
132. Id. at 51. Although the governing body has "overall responsibility," the
implementation of board policy is delegated to the chief executive officer. See id.
at 55. See also supra note 126.
133. JCAH, supra note 98, at 93.
134. Id. at 56.
135. Id. at 55. See generally 9 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2d §§ 136:25-136:28
(1972 & Supp. 1980).
136. JCAH, supra note 98, at 55, 103. See also JCAH MONOGRAPH: MEDICAL
STAFF BYLAWS 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MONOGRAPH].
137. JCAH, supra note 98, at 55. See MONOGRAPH, supra note 136, at 27
("Both the hospital and medical staff bylaws should include a formal means for
the medical staff or its representatives to participate in the development of hospi-
tal policy, particularly as it relates to the discharge of medical staff responsibility
and the quality of patient care.").
138. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
141. See JCAH, supra note 98, at 93-101. See generally, F. GRAD & N.
MARTI, supra note 17, at 204-05; McCall, A Hospital's Liability for Denying, Sus-
pending and Granting Staff Privileges, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 175 (1980).
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as consultation and supervision.14 Finally, there is an organized
committee system to monitor physicians' performance.
14
-
What is the legal relationship between the hospital and its
medical staff in light of the accreditation standards and the organi-
zational mechanism for quality control? Unfortunately, there is no
clear answer to this question. On one hand, there is persuasive evi-
-dence that the medical staff is simply one part of the hospital,
rather than an independent body. For example, one monograph
published by the JCAH states, "in general, the medical staff is not
considered a distinct legal entity, but rather an element of the hos-
,pital corporation. This symbiotic relationship needs to be reflected
in the medical staff bylaws.""'" Several commentators agree that
the hospital and its medical staff are unified." 5 Under this unity
theory, "the organized medical staff is an 'agent' of the hospital
corporation with a mandate to effectuate corporate purposes."",
On the other hand, a few courts have treated the medical staff as
an entity, by allowing an injured patient to sue the medical staff as
an unincorporated association," 7 by holding that the medical staff
can bring an action for a declaratory judgment as an unincorpo-
142. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 17, at 204-05. See Southwick, supra
note 8, at 437.
143. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 17, at 204-05. See Southwick, supra
note 8, at 437. As a result of these mechanisms, commentators have concluded
that the hospital now plays a larger role in medical quality assurance. See M.
ROEMER & J. FRIEDMAN, supra note 129, at 33. According to Roemer and Fried-
man, the hospital's increased role even applies to medical quality assurance
outside of the hospital. Id. See also F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 17, at 210.
144. MONOGRAPH, supra note 136, at 6.
145. See, e.g., Horty & Mulholland, supra note 48, at 487-88, 499. "In fact,
the hospital medical staff is not a legal entity at all. The medical staff has no legal
life of its own and is merely one component of the hospital corporation." Id. at
499. See also Southwick, supra note 126, at 65, 82. ("A hospital, therefore, does
not consist of two organizations or institutions-business and medical. Rather, it
is a single organization."); Stromberg, supra note 43, at 32 ("a non-independent
part of the hospital's corporate form").
146. Southwick, supra note 8, at 437-38. Accord, Stromberg, supra note 43,
at 32.
147. Corleto v. Shore Mem. Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 311-12, 350 A.2d 534,
539 (1975) ("Plaintiffs could have named all 141 doctors individually as defen-
dants, but to do so would serve no useful purpose.").
As to the tort liability of individual members of an unincorporated associa-
tion for the torts of the association, "mere membership in a voluntary association
does not make all members liable for acts of their associates done without their
knowledge or approval." 6 AM. JUR. 2d Associations and Clubs § 48 (1963).
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rated association,4" and by holding that medical staff bylaws are a
contract between the staff and the hospital."1 9 However, those
cases have been persuasively criticized by the commentators.' In
light of the hospital's delegation of its supervisory authority to the
medical staff, it is clear that the medical staff often acts as the
agent of the hospital, regardless of whether the medical staff is also
an independent entity. Therefore, it is unnecessary to determine
whether the medical staff has an independent existence. Rather,
for purposes of hospital liability on grounds of respondeat supe-
rior, in antitrust as well as in negligence, the relevant questions
with regard to a particular action or decision of the medical staff
are (1) whether the physicians were acting as the hospital's medi-
cal staff rather than as individual physicians; and (2) if so, whether
the staff was acting within the scope of its authority as agent of the
hospital. Only if those two requirements are met can the hospital
be held liable for acts of the medical staff as its actual agent. How-
ever, even if the physicians were not acting as the organized agent
of the hospital, or even if they acted beyond the scope of their
authority as agents, the hospital can be held liable on a corporate
liability theory for failure to meet its own legal obligations, and
can also be held liable on a theory of apparent authority for the
acts of those it has held out as its agents.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW TO THE HEALTH CARE
FIELD
A. The Health Care Marketplace
The health care marketplace has several characteristics which
create a unique context for the application of antitrust law. As ex-
pressed in a 1974 Senate Report, "the health care industry does
not respond to classic marketplace forces."'' Because of this
unique market behavior and the regulatory structure enacted to
control that behavior, the United States Supreme Court has indi-
cated that some cooperative activities in the health care field may
148. St. John's Hosp. Medical Staff v. St. John's Regional Medical Center, 90
S.D. 674, 245 N.W.2d 472 (1976).
149. Id. at 679, 245 N.W.2d at 474-75.
150. Horty & Mulholland, supra note 48, at 496-500; Stromberg, supra note
43, at 32.
151. S. Rep. No. 1285, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7842, 7878.
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be immune from federal antitrust laws."'2 Moreover, even in the
absence of antitrust immunity, a trial court in a health care anti-
trust case "should give attention to the particular economic con-
text in which the alleged conspiracy . . . took place."' 5 Therefore,
it is crucial to have at least a basic understanding of the "particu-
lar economic context" of the health care marketplace.
Under traditional forces of supply and demand, the entry of
new suppliers into the marketplace will reduce prices for the goods
or services, by increasing supply and intensifying competition
among suppliers. This increased competition, in turn, will ordina-
rily drive inefficient suppliers from the market, and will discourage
potential suppliers from entering the market. However, in the case
of institutional health care, an increase in the number of providers
in a geographic market does not ordinarily decrease price.'5
Therefore, competition does not weed out the inefficient or prevent
the entry of new providers. Moreover, as Congress has explicitly
determined, "competition does not or will not appropriately allo-
cate supply . . ." of "institutional health services.""55 The failure
of competition to properly allocate supply, geographically or by
product, results from-and perpetuates-the phenomenon that an
excess supply of institutional health care does not decrease the
prices charged. Thus, new providers are still willing to enter an
overcrowded market, and consumers do not derive lower prices
152. National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of
Kansas City, 101 S. Ct. 2415, 2423 n.18 (1981). See infra notes 176-99 and accom-
panying text.
153. Id. at 2424 n.19.
154. One exception to this phenomenon may be the entry of an alternative
type of institutional provider. For example, the opening of an ambulatory surgical
center may provide a less expensive alternative, and may even stimulate local hos-
pitals to increase their outpatient surgery. Similar examples include abortion clin-
ics, emergency medical centers and alternative financing systems such as health
maintenance organizations.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). In addition, Congress has
found that "the effect of competition on decisions of providers respecting the sup-
ply of health services and facilities is diminished," which results in "duplication
and excess supply of certain health services and facilities, particularly in the case
of inpatient health services." 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). See also
S. REP. No. 1285, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7842, 7878 ("investment in costly health care resources . . . is fre-
quently made without regard to the existence of similar facilities or equipment
already operating in an area."). The North Carolina General Assembly has simi-
larly found that "the forces of free market competition are largely absent ... "
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131-175(l) (Supp. 1981).
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from increased competition among providers.
The reasons for the failure of competition to properly allocate
supply or reduce prices for health care are complex. On the de-
mand side, the presence of widespread health insurance severely
limits the need for consumer price consciousness and creates an
insensitivity to price." 6 In addition, faced with potentially life-
threatening illness, consumers feel that money is no object, espe-
cially when it is largely their insurer's money. Thus, individual de-
mand is inelastic, in that an individual's demand for necessary
health services will remain constant despite increases in price. Fi-
nally, health care providers need not compete with the suppliers of
non-health goods and services, because there are no substitutes for
health care, and, therefore, there is no cross-elasticity of demand.
Turning to the supply side, the health care marketplace "does
not respond to classic marketplace forces"' 57 because the market is
a natural monopoly or natural oligopoly. 58 Institutional health
care requires a high level of capital investment, and, therefore,
each provider has high fixed costs, both in absolute terms and in
relation to variable costs. A hospital's capital investment in land,
buildings and equipment cannot be diverted to other product lines
during times of excess capacity, nor can it be moved to another
location to reach patients beyond the hospital's limited service
area. The combination of high fixed costs with the inability to di-
vert to other product or geographic markets indicates a natural
monopoly or natural oligopoly. Under these circumstances, each
156. See generally Marmor, Boyer, and Greenberg, Medical Care and
Procompetitive Reform, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1008 (1981) ("[B]ecause of the
coverage afforded by health insurance, the decision to consume medical care is
not made with limited financial resources.").
157. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
158. See generally Gellhorn, An Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 1975
DUKE L.J. 1, 35 n.32. "When it is necessary to allow a firm a market monopoly in
order to realize economies of scale, a 'natural monopoly' is said to exist. In such
markets, government price regulation is frequently imposed to prevent the 'natu-
ral monopolist' from pushing price above competitive levels." Id.
Significantly, almost every state regulates market entry for institutional
health care, but few states regulate health care prices. The anomaly of entry bar-
riers without rate regulation was one of the factors cited by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in invalidating the prior North Carolina certificate of need law. In
re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 550, 193 S.E.2d
729, 734 (1973). The presence of governmental barriers to market entry, combined
with the absence of widespread price regulation, creates a unique marketplace for
the application of antitrust law.
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provider must have a large market share in order to provide
enough services to cover its high fixed costs. A new provider's entry
into the marketplace will decrease the market shares of existing
providers, and cause the high fixed costs to be spread over a
smaller volume of services. This increases the cost for each unit of
services, and forces each provider to raise the price it charges to
consumers.
Normally, when there is excess supply and high price in an
overcrowded market, at least one provider would be expected to
lower its price in order to obtain a larger share of the total market
demand and to drive less efficient providers from the marketplace.
However, there is little, if any, price competition among health
care institutions, even in an overcrowded market. One reason is
that a price-cutter would not necessarily obtain a larger share of
the health care market, because consumers do not make choices
among competing hospitals on the basis of price. Rather, consum-
ers are treated at a hospital where their own physician has admit-
ting privileges. Therefore, the choice of provider is delegated to the
admitting physician, rather than being made by the consumer or
third-party payor. In addition, as discussed above, the market is
insensitive to price. Hospitals do not advertise their prices, nor do
they encourage physicians to choose a hospital for their patients on
the basis of price. Although hospitals may compete for each physi-
cian's patients on matters other than price, such as new equipment
and convenience for physicians, a hospital would not necessarily
obtain a larger market share by cutting its prices.
Another reason for the lack of price competition is that society
does not want the adverse effects of price competition in the health
care field, and, therefore, has not encouraged price competition.
Despite the recent clamor for competition as the supposed panacea
for all problems of cost and bureaucracy, society cannot tolerate
the effects of cutthroat price competition in health care. First,
price competition would reduce the quality of care, by forcing
providers to use the cheapest methods and supplies, regardless of
the provider's judgment as to quality. This situation is analogous
to the milk industry, for which society has rejected price competi-
tion in favor of price supports, in order to prevent producers from
having to cut corners on cleanliness. 169 Moreover, price competi-
159. See, e.g., State of North Carolina ex rel North Carolina Milk Comm'n v.
National Food Stores, Inc., 270 N.C. 323, 332, 154 S.E.2d 548, 555 (1967) ("[T]he
purpose of the act creating the Milk Commission was to protect the public inter-
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tion in the health care field would have one of two alternative con-
sequences, neither of which is socially desirable. If price competi-
tion significantly reduces prices, then one or more hospitals in each
area will be driven out of business because of their inability to
meet their high fixed costs. One aspect of a competitive market is
that some existing providers will be driven out of the market, but
this is socially unacceptable in the case of local hospitals. The
other possible result of price competition is that prices will not be
reduced, but rather will stabilize at a high level in a mature oligop-
oly. Each provider in a mature oligopoly follows the others'
changes in price, and all providers charge high prices. No provider
could obtain a long-term advantage by cutting its price, because
the other providers would follow suit by cutting their prices,
thereby restoring the original market shares at lower prices for all
providers. 60 Therefore, prices will remain at a high level, and even
more providers will be willing to enter the overcrowded market.
Despite the political rhetoric of competition and deregulation, the
consequences of cutthroat competition in health care are socially
intolerable.161
Because competition does not properly allocate supply or re-
duce price, the federal and state governments have developed a
complex regulatory scheme, which, in turn, has furthered the dis-
tortion from traditional market behavior. The most significant ele-
ment in this regulatory scheme is the system of state certificate of
need laws, which create a governmental barrier to market entry.162
est in a sufficient, regularly flowing supply of wholesome milk and, to that end, to
provide a fair price to the milk producer for his product.").
160. See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 666 (1962)
("We could say that each seller has simply decided individually, perhaps after
bitter experience, that it is more profitable not to indulge in price competition
under any but the most pressing circumstances, appealing as price cutting might
appear to be from a less experienced viewpoint.").
161. Even Professor Havighurst, a longtime advocate of competition in
health care, recognizes the dangers of competition.
If we are not careful, the victims of competition may include not only
those who lose monopoly power but also some innocent citizens whose
losses, and some activities whose loss, we are not prepared to tolerate
... .Political leaders and market advocates now have a duty to address
the danger that competition-induced stringencies may widen the cracks
into which some citizens and some useful activities can fall.
Havighurst, Competition in Health Services: Overview, Issues and Answers, 34
VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1158 (1981).
162. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131-175 to -188 (1981 & Supp. 1981).
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Under the National Health Planning and Resources Development
Act of 1974 [NHPRDA],es each state is encouraged to enact a cer-
tificate of need law which meets federal standards, as a condition
of receiving a substantial amount of federal funds."" In order to
meet federal standards, a state certificate of need law must require
a showing of need for constructing new facilities or offering new
services. 65 As one court explained, "[tjhe state system of awarding
certificates of need represents a statutory division of markets, pur-
suant to a Congressional mandate.' ' 6 6 Thus, the regulatory struc-
ture replaces the free market economy in the health care field,
thereby perpetuating the lack of competition which made regula-
tion necessary. 167
163. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k to 300n-5 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See generally,
Schonbrun, Making Certificate of Need Work, 57 N.C.L. Rev. 1259 (1979).
164. See 42 U.S.C. § 300m(d) (Supp. IV 1980). "The Act provides for reduc-
tions in various federal grants to States that do not participate in the planning
process." National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of
Kansas City, 101 S. Ct. 2415, 2420 n.9 (1981).
In 1972, the prior North Carolina Certificate of Need Law was held to violate
the North Carolina Constitution. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp.,
Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973). A new certificate of need statute was
enacted in 1978, together with extensive legislative findings. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 131-175 to -188 (1981 & Supp. 1981). Although the North Carolina Supreme
Court has not yet had the opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the new
law, that law is currently being challenged. In re Denial of Request by Humana
Hosp. Corp. for Reconsideration Hearing for Project No. J-1561-81-Proposed
Construction of Parkway Medical Center, No. 82 CVS 1081 (Super. Court of
Wake County, N.C. filed Feb. 17, 1982).
Although Congress could not require the State of North Carolina to enact a
certificate of need law which violates its state constitution, the United States Su-
preme Court has held that Congress has the power to condition federal grants on
North Carolina's passage of such a law, even if it would violate its state constitu-
tion. North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C.
1977), aff'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978). This federal decision did not deal with the
issue of whether the new North Carolina Certificate of Need Law is valid under
the North Carolina Constitution. See generally, Survey of Developments in
North Carolina Law, 1978, 57 N.C.L. R.v. 827, 852-55 (1979).
165. See generally, National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center v.
Blue Cross of Kansas City, 101 S. Ct. 2415, 2418-21 (1981).
Certificate of need laws arguably give preference to existing providers, in that
the laws do not require existing providers to demonstrate need for the continua-
tion of their existing facilities and services.
166. Phoenix Baptist Hosp. and Medical Center v. Samaritan Health Servs.,
No. 81-5848, slip op. at 5 (9th Cir. August 25, 1982).
167. In 1979, Congress enacted the Health Planning and Resources Develop-
ment Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. 96-79, 93 Stat. 592, which amended the 1974
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The regulatory structure established by the certificate of need
laws is based on planned development of new facilities and ser-
vices, in order to assure that they are needed and prevent unneces-
sary duplication.16' This planning, in turn, contemplates coopera-
tion among the competing providers. 1 9 In a planned economy, as
opposed to a free market economy, it would be considered ineffi-
cient for two hospitals in close proximity to provide obstetrical ser-
vices at 50 percent capacity in each hospital. Similarly, it is waste-
ful for each of two hospitals in an area to purchase expensive
equipment, such as a CAT scanner, if each hospital would only use
its new machine on a part-time basis. Therefore, the theory of the
planning laws is that one hospital would be designated to perform
all obstetrical services for the area, and the other hospital might be
designated to provide all CAT scanning services for the area. Al-
though this allocation is consistent with the theory of a planned
economy, it could run afoul of the antitrust laws as an allocation of
markets if arranged by providers acting entirely on their own with-
out any involvement by planning agencies. 1 0 Even if the state
makes the final decision on which provider may offer a particular
service, the process requires a substantial amount of cooperation
and joint planning by the competing providers, as well as involve-
ment by competing providers with their local planning agencies."'
planning legislation. See generally S. REP. No. 96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted
in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1306; H. Conf. Rep. No. 420, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1422. Although one
purpose of the 1979 amendments was to emphasize the importance of competition
in the health care field, "Congress recognized a distinction between areas where
competition could serve a useful purpose and those where some other allocation of
resources remained necessary." National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology
Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 101 S. Ct. 2415, 2421 (1981) (footnote omit-
ted). Even in the 1979 amendments, Congress determined that "competition does
not or will not appropriately allocate supply. . ." for "inpatient health services
and other institutional health services," and, therefore, the planning agencies
should continue to regulate their supply. 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(b)(2) (Supp. IV
1980).
168. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3001-2(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
169. See National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross
of Kansas City, 101 S. Ct. 2415, 2423 (1981) ("Congress expected HSA planning
to be implemented mainly through persuasion and cooperation.").
170. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (agreement
between competitors to allocate markets is a per se violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act).
171. For example, under federal law, at least 40 percent of the board mem-
bers of the local Health Systems Agencies must be "providers." 42 U.S.C. § 3001-
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Therefore, health care providers are subject to competing federal
policies of the planning laws and antitrust laws.
In predicting the future of the health care marketplace, the
recent political rhetoric of competition must be kept in perspec-
tive. For example, in May, 1982, the Congressional Budget Office
concluded that the short-run effect of competition on hospital
costs may seem inadequate to some people."' Moreover, even pro-
ponents of competition do not advocate the elimination of all regu-
lation and the substitution of pure competition.17 3 There will al-
ways be some mixture of competition and regulation in health care,
with the issue being the amount of each in the mixture. For exam-
ple, the regulatory approach of prospective payment has been sug-
gested as a complement to competition, rather than as a substitute
for competition.17' Thus, at any one time, a mixture of competition
and regulation will make up the "particular economic context" of
the health care marketplace.
1(b)(3)(C) (Supp. IV 1980).
172. Congressional Budget Office, Containing Medical Care Costs Through
Market Forces xvi (May, 1982).
Some may not regard the magnitude of the effects of market-oriented
options to be large enough in the short run, however, especially with re-
gard to hospital costs. Prospective payment of hospitals-a regulatory
approach in which third parties set rates for hospital payment in ad-
vance-might be considered as a complement to market-oriented
options.
Id. (footnote omitted).
173. See, e.g., Havighurst, Competition in Health Services: Overview, Issues
and Answers, 34 VAND. L. Rzv. 1117 (1981). "Informed advocates of a market-
oriented strategy do not all view issues in precisely the same way. Significant dif-
ferences exist, for example, regarding the need for regulation to structure and
limit the range of consumer choice in order to improve the intelligibility of
choices and to prevent improvident ones." Id. at 1118.
See generally, Bovbjerg, Competition Versus Regulation in Medical Care:
An Overdrawn Dichotomy, 34 VAND. L. Rzv. 965, (1981). "The possibilities usu-
ally are posed as a choice between increased government regulation to control
medical costs or increased competition. This dichotomy, however, is overly sim-
plistic." Id. at 966.
174. See supra note 172.
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B. Major Areas of Antitrust Concern for Health Care
Providers175
1. Planning and Certificate of Need
Although there is no blanket antitrust immunity for all health
planning activities, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that there may be antitrust immunity for some cooperative
health planning.1 7' In National Gerimedical Hospital and Geron-
tology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, Blue Cross refused to
contract with plaintiff's new hospital on the ground that the local
Health Systems Agency (HSA) had not made a finding of need for
plaintiff's hospital.1 77 Plaintiff brought an antitrust action under
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,1" claiming that the refusal
by Blue Cross to enter into a participating hospital agreement con-
stituted a wrongful refusal to deal and a conspiracy with the
HSA.1 71 The United States District Court for the Western District
of Missouri granted summary judgment for defendants on the
ground that the antitrust laws were impliedly repealed by the
NHPRDA.180 The summary judgment for defendants was affirmed
on the same ground by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, '" but the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari18 2 and reversed.18 3
175. See generally M. THompsoN ANTrSu'r AND THE HEALTH CARE PRO-
VIDER (1979); Thompson & Scott, Antitrust Considerations and Defenses in Reor-
ganizing for Multi-Institutional Activities, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 465 (1982).
176. National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of
Kansas City, 101 S. Ct. 2415, 2423 n.18 (1981).
177. Id. at 2417-18.
178. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
179. 101 S. Ct. at 2418. The Supreme Court noted that Blue Cross had en-
tered into participating hospital agreements with plaintiff's competitors, which
may have put plaintiff at a competitive disadvantage. 101 S. Ct. at 2417 n.2. As
the Court explained:
participating hospitals receive direct reimbursement of the full costs of
covered services rendered to individual Blue Cross subscribers. When
subscribers receive care in hospitals that are not participating members,
Blue Cross pays only 80% of the cost, and these payments are made to
the subscriber, rather than directly to the hospital.
Id. at 2417 (footnote omitted).
180. 479 F. Supp. 1012 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
181. 628 F.2d 1050, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 1980) ("the Act and regulatory scheme
clearly call for the action which has now become the basis of an antitrust claim.").
182. 101 S. Ct. 938 (1981).
183. 101 S. Ct. 2415 (1981).
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As the Supreme Court explained, implied antitrust immunity
is a matter of congressional intent.184 Moreover, implied repeal of
the antitrust laws requires a "clear repugnancy" between the anti-
trust laws and the subsequent legislation.1 85 For example, there
may be an implied repeal of the antitrust laws where the subse-
quent legislation requires a party to do something forbidden by
the antitrust laws, or where applying the antitrust laws would con-
flict with the orders of a regulatory agency. 86 However, there was
no implied antitrust immunity on the facts of that particular case,
because there was no congressional intent to repeal and no "clear
repugnancy.' 87 Because there had been no state certificate of need
law in effect in Missouri, there was no state regulation of hospital
construction and the HSA merely acted in a private advisory ca-
pacity.188 Moreover, the NHPRDA does not require Blue Cross to
enforce HSA advice by refusing to deal with plaintiff, nor is there
any indication that Congress intended HSA advice to be enforced
by private insurers. 8 9 Finally, there was no regulatory compulsion
or approval of Blue Cross' actions by an administrative agency. 190
Therefore, there was no congressional intent to repeal the antitrust
laws, and no "clear repugnancy."19'
After holding that there was no implied immunity on the facts
of that particular case, the Court also held that there is no blanket
antitrust immunity for all private planning activities.192 "In other
industrial contexts, we have refused such a blanket exemption, de-
184. 101 S. Ct. at 2421 ("To be sure, where Congress did intend to repeal the
antitrust laws, that intent governs . .. , but this intent must be clear.").
185. Id.
186. See 101 S. Ct. at 2421-22. "Intent to repeal the antitrust laws is much
clearer when a regulatory agency has been empowered to authorize or require the
type of conduct under antitrust challenge." Id. Moreover, as the Court noted,
"antitrust repeals are especially disfavored where the antitrust implications of a
business decision have not been considered by a governmental entity." 101 S. Ct.
at 2422.
187. Id. at 2422-23.
188. Id. at 2422 & n.15. Moreover, according to the HSA's health systems
plan, new hospital construction would be regulated "'by an appropriate review
agency.'" Id. at 2422 n.14. The HSA's advisory status was unaffected by its fed-
eral creation and funding. Id. at 2422.
189. Id. at 2422-23. The Court also noted that HSAs are only required to
seek the assistance of private parties "to the extent practicable." Id. at 2423 (cit-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 3001-2(c)(1)).
190. 101 S. Ct. at 2422.
191. Id. at 2422-23.
192. Id. at 2423-24.
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spite a clear congressional finding that some substitution of regula-
tion for competition was necessary."'" The rejection of blanket
immunity in other industries has been based on the goal of recon-
ciling the antitrust laws and the subsequent legislation, rather than
simply rejecting the antitrust laws.19" Because there was no evi-
dence of a contrary congressional intent in the health care field,
the court rejected a blanket immunity for all health planning
activities. 1"
National Gerimedical involved a unique factual situation
which will be easily distinguished in future cases. First, there was
no state certificate of need law in effect at the time.'" Moreover,
the Court took pains to clarify that its holding referred only to the
facts of that particular case. 1 7 Finally, the Court gave an example
of a possible case for antitrust immunity. "Where, for example, an
HSA has expressly advocated a form of cost-saving cooperation
among providers, it may be that antitrust immunity is 'necessary
to make the [NHPRDA] work.' "" Thus, there may be implied
antitrust immunity where an HSA expressly advocates a course of
action rather than merely advises. Similarly, there would be a
stronger case for immunity in cases of cooperation as opposed to a
refusal to deal, especially if the cooperation involved providers
rather than a third party insurer."9
Even in the absence of antitrust immunity for health planning
activities, there is a narrow area for the application of the rule of
reason under the doctrine enunciated in Silver v. New York Stock
193. Id. at 2423.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2422-23. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. See also
Note, Health Law-The Conflict With Antitrust Law-National Gerimedical
Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 18 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 591, 609 (1982) ("the court has not decided how it will apply antitrust
immunity to a health planning scheme when state mechanisms are in effect").
197. 101 S. Ct. at 2422-23, 2423 n.18. "[W]e emphasize that our holding does
not foreclose future claims of antitrust immunity in other factual contexts." Id. at
2423 n.18.
198. 101 S. Ct. at 2423 n.18 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373
U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
199. As the Court noted in National Gerimedical, "[sluch a case would differ
substantially from the present one, where the conduct at issue was not coopera-
tion among providers, but an insurer's refusal to deal with a provider that failed
to heed the advice of an HSA." 101 S. Ct. at 2424 n.18.
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Exchange.200 In Silver, the Exchange and its members boycotted a
nonmember by ordering members to eliminate telephone connec-
tions with the nonmember.210 Thus, the Supreme Court was re-
quired to address the interface between the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the federal antitrust laws. As the Court noted,
"[i]t is plain, to begin with, that removal of the wires by collective
action of the Exchange and its members would, had it occurred in
a context free from other federal regulation, constitute a per se
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 20 2 Although the Court re-
jected the defense of implied immunity from the antitrust laws,203
it held that it was necessary to apply the rule of reason, rather
than the per se rule, in order "to permit the Exchange sufficient
breathing space within which to carry out the mandate of the Se-
curities Exchange Act.' 2 " As the Court explained, "particular in-
stances of exchange self-regulation which fall within the scope and
purposes of the Securities Exchange Act may be regarded as justi-
fied in answer to the assertion of an antitrust claim.
205
In a recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit applied the Silver analysis to health planning
activities.2 In Hospital Building Company v. Trustees of Rex
Hospital,207 the Fourth Circuit held that the trial court should use
a rule of reason analysis to determine whether defendants' health
planning activities were an unreasonable restraint of trade, rather
than simply condemning their activities as unlawful per se. * * As
the court explained, "planning activities of private health services
providers are not 'unreasonable' restraints under § 1 if undertaken
in good faith and if their actual and intended effects lay within
those envisioned by specific federal legislation in place at the time
of the challenged activities as desirable consequences of such plan-
ning activities."' 20 ' Thus, just as in Silver, the competing demands
200. 373 U.S. 341, 360-61 (1963).
201. Id. at 343, 347-48.
202. Id. at 347.
203. Id. at 360-61.
204. Id. at 360.
205. Id. at 361.
206. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir.
1982).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 685-86.
209. Id. at 685 (citing Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 360-61
(1963)). "Specifically we hold that 'planning' under this special rule of reason is
not 'reasonable' if its purpose or effect is only to protect existing health care prov-
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of the antitrust laws and another federal statute require the appli-
cation of the rule of reason.210 In the language of Silver, "particular
instances . .. which fall within the scope and purposes of the
[other federal statute] may be regarded as justified in answer to
the assertion of an antitrust claim. 21 1
Another crucial concept in applying antitrust law to health
planning is the first amendment protection for joint petitioning ac-
tivity. Under the doctrine of Eastern Railroad Presidents Confer-
ence v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.12 and United Mine Workers v.
Pennington,"8 private parties are entitled to take concerted action
before governmental bodies to oppose their competitors, regardless
of anti-competitive intent. 4 Nevertheless, the first amendment
protection for joint petitioning activity may be lost if the joint op-
position is a mere "sham.""' As the court explained in Noerr,
"[t]here may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensi-
bly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere
sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor
and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified."'" For
example, in the administrative or judicial arenas, abuses such as
perjury, misrepresentations, and conspiracy with a licensing au-
thority would constitute a "sham," and, therefore, would be sub-
ject to antitrust scrutiny.217 The first amendment immunity will be
lost if the purpose of the joint petitioning activity is solely to pre-
vent a competitor from having access to governmental agencies. "s
iders from the competitive threat of potential entrants into or expanders within
the same 'market."' Hospital Bldg. Co., at 686 (emphasis added).
210. Hospital Bldg. Co., at 685-86.
211. Silver, 373 U.S. at 361.
212. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
213. 381 U.S. 657, 669-71 (1965).
214. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139-40; Pennington, 381 US. at 670. "[Alt least inso-
far as the railroads' campaign was directed toward obtaining governmental action,
its legality was not at all affected by any anticompetitive purpose it may have
had." Noer, 365 U.S. at 139-40. Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1942) (anti-
trust immunity for acts of a state).
215. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
216. Id.
217. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512-
13 (1972).
218. See id. at 515; id. at 518 (Stewart, J., concurring). "[T]he respondents
are entitled to prove that the real intent of the conspirators was not to invoke the
processes of the administrative agencies and courts, but to discourage and ulti-
mately to prevent the respondents from invoking those processes." Id. at 518
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In the health care field, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit has recently emphasized that the sham excep-
tion to Noerr-Pennington immunity depends upon the defendants'
intent.219 As examples of a possible "sham," the Fourth Circuit
cited a baseless appeal with intent to delay plaintiff's entry into
the market and a conspiracy with intent to prevent plaintiff from
having "meaningful access" to the planning agency and certificate
of need agency."0O Finally, in the context of judicial proceedings,
the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity would apply
"if such proceedings are baseless, repetitive and brought with the
intent to abuse the judicial process.""'
2. Price Fixing
Price fixing is a term of art which includes any means to con-
trol or stabilize price, even if the price to consumers is lowered or
maintained at a "fair market price."'22 Thus, it is even unlawful to
fix a maximum price."13 Price fixing agreements are unlawful per
se, in that they can never be justified as reasonable or necessary in
a particular case." 4 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court
(Stewart, J., concurring). Fair access to governmental agencies is also protected by
statutes and regulations concerning conflicts of interest and ex parte contacts.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300n-l(b)(12)(F) (Supp. IV 1980) (ex parte contacts); 42
C.F.R. § 122.308(a)(11) (1981) (conflicts of interest within health systems agency).
219. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678, 687-88 (4th
Cir. 1982).
220. Id. at 687-88. Similarly, "misrepresentations made with intent to abuse
the administrative processes so as to deny [plaintiff] meaningful access to the
[state certificate of need agency] would fall within the sham exception." Id. at
687.
221. Id. at 688.
222. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940)
("a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing,
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign
commerce. . . ."). Even an agreement on credit terms is illegal price fixing. Cata-
lano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
223. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). As the
Court explained, "[f]or such agreements, no less than those to fix minimum
prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in
accordance with their own judgment." Id. at 213.
224. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940). It is
not only illegal per se for competitors to horizontally agree on price, but it is also
illegal per se for a wholesaler to vertically agree with a retailer on the price at
which the retailer will resell the goods. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (vertical agreement fixing minimum resale prices).
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has recently held that price fixing in the health care field is subject
to the same rules of per se illegality as in any other industry, not-
withstanding the unique characteristics of the health care market-
place.2 Therefore, avoiding price fixing is just as important to
health care providers as to any other business or individual.""
Moreover, the reimbursement system and the public policy of cost
containment create additional price fixing problems in the health
care field.
Many health care providers do not realize that cost contain-
ment schemes, although otherwise laudable, may involve illegal
price fixing. 2 7 For example, the United States Supreme Court re-
cently condemned a mechanism for medical cost containment as
Such vertical minimum price fixing is also known as resale price maintenance. A
vertical agreement to fix maximum resale prices is also per se unlawful. Albrecht
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
Nevertheless, in at least one alleged price fixing case, the United States Su-
preme Court avoided the per se rule by holding that the arrangement only consti-
tuted price fixing in a "literal sense." Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979). In Broadcast Music, the Court concluded
that the blanket license was a different product from the license that any individ-
ual member could have offered, and, therefore, the blanket licensor was not
merely a joint sales agency fixing prices for all its members. 441 U.S. at 22-24.
One author has suggested that the holding in Broadcast Music was based on the
traditional doctrine permitting reasonable restraints which are ancillary to licens-
ing agreements and joint ventures. Louis, Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures
and Licensing Agreements: Do Sealy and Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and
Broadcast Music? 66 VA. L. Rxv. 879, 880, 898 (1980).
225. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982). "We
are equally unpersuaded by the argument that we should not apply the per se
rule in this case because the judiciary has little antitrust experience in the health
care industry." Id. at 2476 (footnote omitted).
226. Just as any other sellers of services, health care providers must indepen-
dently determine their rates. Similarly, as large-scale purchasers of labor, provid-
ers must act independently in determining their employees' salaries. See also
White and White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 540 F. Supp. 951 (W.D.
Mich. 1982) (awarding treble damages and enjoining joint purchasing
arrangement).
227. One cost containment scheme that is now subject to antitrust scrutiny is
peer review in which an insurer contracts with a provider's professional society to
determine the reasonableness of the provider's claim for insurance reimburse-
ment. In Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. 3002 (1982), the United
States Supreme Court held that such peer review is not included within the "bus-
iness of insurance," and, therefore, is subject to antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 3011.
See generally, Borsody and Tiano, Peer Review and the Antitrust Laws: An
Analysis and a Proposal, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 511 (1982).
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horizontal price fixing.22 s In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society,2 " two county medical societies established "foundations
for medical care," which are nonprofit corporations composed of
physicians.230 Under the foundation membership agreements, phy-
sicians agreed among themselves to adhere to a schedule of maxi-
mum fees set by majority vote. 3 1 These maximum fees applied to
all patients insured by plans which had agreed to pay up to the
maximum amount.'32 In those cases, the member physicians agreed
to accept the maximum fee from the insurer as payment in full,
and could not charge the patient for any excess amount.'33 The
Supreme Court held that the foundation membership agreements
constituted horizontal price fixing, and, therefore, were illegal per
se. 2,
Maricopa raises serious questions about other cooperative ac-
tivities for cost containment, including activities of provider as-
sociations and coalitions. Health care providers often forget that a
society of providers, by definition, is a combination of competitors
and that anything a society does in restraint of trade is a combina-
tion in restraint of trade. This is especially important in the area
of data dissemination. "35 Under established case law, the exchange
of price information among competitors may constitute illegal
price fixing, even without an agreement to adhere to a fixed price,
if the effect is to stabilize prices by permitting each seller to match
its competitors' prices.3 6 In the health care field, the Antitrust Di-
228. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2472, 2480
(1982). Although there was a dispute as to whether the challenged mechanism
raised or lowered health care costs, the Court was obligated for purposes of sum-
mary judgment to accept defendants' position that costs were lowered. Id. at
2470-71.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 2470-71.
231. Id. at 2471.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2475. The holding is based on a four-to-three decision, with two
justices not participating. Id. at 2480.
235. See generally Comment, Anticompetitive Data Dissemination in the
Medical Profession: The Conflict Between the Sherman Act and the First
Amendment, 1980 DuKE L.J. 1142; Comment, Relative Value Guides and the
Sherman Antitrust Act, 33 VAND. L. REv. 233 (1980).
236. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 336-37
(1969) ("Stablizing prices as well as raising them is within the ban of § 1 of the
Sherman Act."). As Justice Fortas explained in his concurring opinion,
Thus the exchange of prices made it possible for individual defendants
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vision of the United States Department of Justice has recently re-
leased a business review letter indicating that it will not challenge
the collection of hospital data by a Health Systems Agency
(HSA). 3 7 Under that proposal, providers would not communicate
among themselves, but rather would voluntarily supply the infor-
mation to the HSA.38s Moreover, providers would retain the right
to alter their prices at will. 23 9 Similarly, the Antitrust Division re-
cently issued a business review letter approving the activities of a
"business coalition" in reviewing information already collected by
the Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission.240 How-
ever, this proposal involved data which had already been collected
and did not involve the direct exchange of data among competing
providers.4 1 Moreover, the Antitrust Division warned that partici-
pants must avoid "procedures that could facilitate anticompetitive
arrangements among competing members .. ".. "24 Therefore, the
apparent safe harbors established by these business review letters
are quite narrow, and providers must still be cautious of any "in-
terference with the setting of price by free market forces . 24
3. Medical Staff Privileges and Exclusive Contracts
The denial or revocation of staff privileges is an area of in-
creasing antitrust concern, and there are additional complications
confidently to name a price equal to that which their competitors were
asking. The obvious effect was to "stabilize" prices by joint arrange-
ment-at least to limit any price cuts to the minimum necessary to meet
competition. In addition, there was evidence that, in some instances, dur-
ing periods when various defendants ceased exchanging prices exception-
ally sharp and vigorous price reductions resulted.
Id. at 339-40 (Fortas, J., concurring). But see United States v. American Soc'y of
Anesthesiologists, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 147, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (society's publica-
tion of "relative value guide" not unlawful per se).
237. Letter from William P. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, to Robert
Azar, Executive Director of Southwest Michigan Health Systems Agency (March
2, 1982).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Letter from William P. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, to Patrick
N. Renaud, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, and John P. Hanna, Esq., Senior Vice
President and General Counsel of Health Insurance Association of America (Feb-
ruary 22, 1982).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) (citing
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940)).
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if the denial is based on the hospital's exclusive contract with the
aggrieved physician's competitor.4 4 Although there is still dispute
as to the nexus with interstate commerce in staff privilege cases,
courts often find a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to in-
voke the federal antitrust laws.2'" Therefore, health care providers
must consider the anticompetitive effects of their staff privilege de-
cisions and exclusive contracts, and not merely the patient care as-
pects or procedural requirements of their medical staff bylaws. 4 6
As discussed above, a health care institution will be held liable
on grounds of corporate liability for negligently admitting an in-
competent physician to staff membership or negligently permitting
a known incompetent to practice medicine in the institution. '4 7
This potential liability forces institutions to screen and supervise
staff physicians' 4  The institution's supervisory duties are dele-
gated to the licensed professionals on its medical staff, who act as
agents for the institution in reviewing applications for staff privi-
leges.2 49 Nevertheless, the institution's governing body remains re-
sponsible for medical staff appointments.2 50 Therefore, the institu-
tion is the legally responsible party; but it is forced to use a
procedure which delegates screening and supervision to a physi-
cian's competitors, which involves serious anticompetitive
potential.5 1
244. See generally Liebenluft and Pollard, Antitrust Scrutiny of the Health
Professions: Developing a Framework for Assessing Private Restraints, 34 VAND.
L. REv. 927, 932 (1981) ("Increasingly, boycott tactics are being employed in the
denial of hospital privileges. . ."). See generally Foster, Exclusive Arrangements
Between Hospitals and Physicians: Antitrust's Next Frontier in Health?, 26 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 535 (1982); Comment, Denial of Open Staff Hospital Privileges: An
Antitrust Scrutiny, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 751 (1982); Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 1268
(1976) (exclusive contracts).
245. See supra note 1. A sufficient nexus with interstate commerce was also
found in the following cases: Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d
715 (10th Cir. 1981) (rehearing en banc); McDonald v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of At-
lanta, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Malini v. Singleton & Assocs., 516 F.
Supp. 440 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Feldman v. Jackson Memorial Hosp., 509 F. Supp.
815 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 876 (W.D. Pa.
1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 302 (1982).
246. Cf. Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 645 (1971) (discussing non-antitrust aspects of
medical staff privilege disputes).
247. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 114, 117-18 and accompanying text.
251. In a recent business review letter, the Antitrust Division of the Office of
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In addition to the anticompetitive potential in the staff privi-
lege procedure, special problems are presented by exclusive con-
tracts between the hospital and an aggrieved physician's competi-
tor. Traditionally, exclusive contracts to provide services in
specialized departments were upheld as reasonable and necessary
for quality medical care.25' Under more recent antitrust challenge,
courts have differed in analysis and result. For example, in Dos
Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center,'"8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to enjoin
an exclusive anesthesiology contract.'" In contrast, in Hyde v. Jef-
ferson Parish Hospital District No. 2, the United States Court
the Maryland Attorney General succinctly explained the anticompetitive poten-
tial in the staff privilege procedure:
The principal danger, in antitrust terms, inherent in the procedure
for awarding hospital staff privileges is that doctors with privileges may
combine to use their decision-making authority to exclude their competi-
tors from access to essential hospital facilities. The members of the Med-
ical Staff are independent practitioners, competing with each other for
patients and profit. In almost all medical specialties, the ability to admit
and treat patients at a hospital is essential to a physician's practice.
Without hospital privileges, a physician must refer to other physicians
those patients who require hospitalization. For these reasons, it inures to
the competitive and financial advantage of doctors who have staff privi-
leges to preclude their competitors from obtaining them. Where doctors
with privileges are empowered to, and do in fact, deny privileges to ap-
plicants for their personal competitive advantage, a group boycott exists,
in violation of the Maryland Antitrust Act, Md. Com. Law Code Ann. §§
11-201 - 11-213 (1975). Restraints of trade are contrary to our most basic
national policy in favor of free competition and cannot be tolerated. In
the final analysis, the question presented here, like so many antitrust
issues relating to the professions, is who controls professional access to
the marketplace. In this respect, the medical profession is no different
than any other business or industry - it is vulnerable to the danger that
concentrated economic power will be used to choke off competition.
Letter from Stephen H. Sachs, Maryland Attorney General, to Benson E. Legg,'
Esq. (Feb. 10, 1982). See also Note, Physician Influence: Applying Noerr-Pen-
nington to the Medical Profession, 1978 DuKE L.J. 701. "When physicians as in-
dependent professionals act in concert with other doctors to influence the hospital
staff committees to deny potentially competing, qualified applicants hospital staff
privileges, these physicians may be violating the antitrust laws." Id. at 715-16.
252. See, e.g., Centeno v. Rolesville Community Hosp., 107 Cal. App. 3d 62,
167 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1979); Lewin v. St. Joseph Hosp. of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d
368, 146 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1978).
253. 684 F.2d 1346 (7th Cir. 1982) (dissolving preliminary injunction).
254. Id. at 1348 and 1355.
255. 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'g. 513 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. La. 1981).
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of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit condemned an exclusive anesthesi-
ology contract as a per se unlawful tying arrangement.2 " There-
fore, exclusive contracts are an area of increasing antitrust concern
'for health care institutions.
V. THE APPLICATION OF AGENCY THEORIES TO IMPOSE VICARIOUS
ANTITRUST LIABILITY ON HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
A. The Theory of Vicarious Antitrust Liability
Vicarious liability is liability for the fault of another.5 7 For
example, hospitals are often held liable in tort for the malpractice
of an agent, without any evidence of negligent selection or supervi-
sion by the hospital. 58 Rather than being based on a concept of
fault, vicarious liability is based on policy grounds of allocating
risk, providing adequate compensation to injured parties, and pro-
viding an incentive to practice caution on the part of employers.2 '
256. Id. at 294. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that defendant hospital forced
users of its operating rooms to also use its anesthesiology service. Id. at 289. As
the court explained:
A tying arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell one product but
only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product . . . . " Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 78
S.Ct. 514, 2 L.Ed. 2d 545 (1958). The existence of a tying arrangement in
this case has never been seriously disputed by appellees, since it is clear
that users of the hospital's operating rooms (the tying product) are also
compelled to purchase the hospital's chosen anesthesia service (the tied
product). It is also clear that we are dealing with two distinct services
which a buyer should be able to obtain separately.
Id. at 289. Under the court's analysis, defendant hospital had sufficient market
power in operating rooms to constitute an illegal tying arrangement. Id. at 291.
257. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed. 1971).
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line
R. Co., 278 U.S. 349 (1929), "few doctrines of the law are more firmly established
or more in harmony with accepted notions of social policy than that of the liabil-
ity of the principal without fault of his own." Id. at 356. See generally, supra
notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
259. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed. 1971).
What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability
is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by
the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in
the conduct of the employer's enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise
itself, as a required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the
employer because, having engaged in an enterprise which will, on the ba-
sis of all past experience, involve harm to others through the torts of
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Because vicarious liability is liability without fault, the party held
liable will consider it unfair and perhaps frightening. Even more
frightening is the prospect of vicarious liability without fault for
treble damages and attorneys' fees in a civil antitrust suit. Under
established case law, businesses and nonprofit corporations can be
held vicariously liable for antitrust violations, with consequent lia-
bility for treble damages and attorneys' fees.' 0
Vicarious antitrust liability is not a new concept. In 1973, a
corporation was held criminally liable under federal antitrust law
for the conduct of its agent, without the need for any evidence that
the corporate entity joined in the illegal activities. " " In United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,6 2 the corporate defendant's
purchasing agent participated in a boycott of certain suppliers, in
violation of direct instructions from the corporate defendant's
manager. 6 3 The corporation was convicted under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, and the conviction was affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.2 " As the Ninth Cir-
cuit explained, "as a general rule a corporation is liable under the
Sherman Act for the acts of its agents in the scope of their employ-
employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the
innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better
able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or lia-
bility insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the
community at large. Added to this is the makeweight argument that an
employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be
careful in the selection, instruction and supervision of his servants and to
take every precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted safely.
Id.
260. See infra notes 261-75 and accompanying text.
261. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied sub nom. Western Int'l Hotels Co. v. United States, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973).
A corporate entity can violate a statute through the acts of its agents. United
States v. A & P Trucking, 358 U.S. 121, 125-26 (1958) ("it is elementary that such
impersonal entities can be guilty of 'knowing' or 'willful' violations of regulatory
statutes through the doctrine of respondeat superior.'. Moreover, a corporation
can be held criminally liable for the acts of its agents. United States v. Dot-
terweich, 320 U.S. 177, 281 (1943).
262. 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Western Int'l Ho-
tels Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
263. Id. at 1007.
264. Id. at 1002, 1008. Moreover, even though the corporation's manager was
acquitted, evidence connecting the manager with the conspiracy was properly con-
sidered in connecting the corporation with the conspiracy. Id. at 1008.
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ment, even though contrary to general corporate policy and express
instructions to the agent.' ' 66
The impact of the holding in Hilton Hotels Corp. was limited
somewhat by the court's further holding that a corporation will
only be held vicariously liable if the agent was acting to benefit the
corporation. 2" As the Ninth Circuit explained, vicarious antitrust
liability would only be imposed where the agent was acting within
the scope of his employment, which was defined to require that the
agent acted to benefit the corporation." 7 However, this limitation
has recently been rejected by the United States Supreme Court in
American Society of Mechnical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel
Corp.2' In American Society of Mechnical Engineers,26 the Su-
preme Court held that a nonprofit organization was properly held
liable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for the acts of its
agents, even though the agents did not act with an intent to bene-
fit the organization.7 0 Moreover, the nonprofit organization was
held liable without having ratified the acts of its agents who were
only acting with apparent authority. 7 1 In that case, employees of
one manufacturer used their positions and contacts with a non-
profit, standard-setting organization to injure a competitor of their
employer.' 7 ' Specifically, they caused the nonprofit organization to
publish a letter stating that the competitor's product failed to
comply with the organization's standards .'7  These activities put
the competitor at a severe disadvantage in the marketplace, even
though the organization's agents were only acting with apparent
authority.'7 ' Therefore, the nonprofit organization was held vicari-
ously liable for treble damages on a theory of apparent
authority.7 3
The application of vicarious antitust liability in Hilton Hotels
Corp. and American Society of Mechanical Engineers is analogous
265. Id. at 1007.
266. Id. at 1006 n.4 & 1007.
267. Id.
268. 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1946-48.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1939-41.
273. Id.
274. See id. at 1941.
275. Id. at 1948 ("We have no difficulty in finding that this set of facts falls
well within the scope of ASME's liability on an apparent authority theory.").
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to the vicarious tort liability of a hospital for the negligence of its
agent, even though the hospital was not negligent in its selection or
supervision of the agent.27 6 In contrast, if the corporate entities
had made corporate decisions to join in an illegal boycott or re-
strain competition, it would have been analogous to a hospital's
corporate liability in tort for violation of the hospital's own duty of
care. 7 In one sense, it is redundant to speak of a corporation's
vicarious liability for the acts of its agents, because a corporation
can only act through its agents, including its officers, directors and
employees. Thus, every act of a corporation is arguably nothing
more than the act of its agent which is imputed to the corporation.
Nevertheless, in dealing with the legal fiction of the corporation, a
distinction can be made between the corporation's "own" action
through its board of directors or management, on one hand, and
the corporation's vicarious liability for the act of a mere agent, on
the other hand. This distinction, in turn, is analogous to the dis-
tinction between a hospital's vicarious liability and corporate lia-
bility in the negligence field .2" The significance of this distinction
is that additional defenses may be available in cases of vicarious
liability.279
The reasons for imposing vicarious antitrust liability, as well
as the contours of that liability, are based on the procompetitive
policies of the antitrust laws.280 These policies, in turn, will control
the application of vicarious antitrust liability to the health care
field. As a policy matter, the principal basis for imposing vicarious
antitrust liability is to deter future restraints against competi-
tion.26  For example, in Hilton Hotels Corp., the Ninth Circuit
concluded that it would be ineffective to attempt to punish indi-
vidual agents,8 2 whereas "exposure of the corporate entity to po-
276. See supra notes 40-99 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 100-19 and accompanying text.
278. See supra text at notes 38-39. However, vicarious liability and corporate
liability often overlap. See supra note 112.
279. See infra note 319 and accompanying text.
280. See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d at 1005. "The breadth and criti-
cal character of the public interests protected by the Sherman Act, and the grav-
ity of the threat to those interests that led to the enactment of the statute, sup-
port a construction holding business organizations accountable, as a general rule,
for violations of the Act by their employees in the course of their businesses." Id.
281. See id. at 1006; American Soc'y of Mechnical Eng'rs, 102 S. Ct. at 1945.
282. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d at 1006. The Ninth Circuit identified at
least two separate reasons for the ineffectiveness of attempting to punish individ-
ual agents. First, it may be impossible to identify the responsible individual
108 [Vol. 5:61
48
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss1/2
VICARIous ANTITRUST LIABILITY
tential conviction may provide a substantial spur to corporate ac-
tion to prevent violations by employees."183 A second reason for
imposing vicarious antitrust liability is the fairness of imposing lia-
bility on the corporate entity which reaps the illegal profit from its
agent's restraint of trade.284 Finally, the court in Hilton Hotels
Corp. concluded that there is a probability that high corporate of-
ficers were involved in-or had knowledge of-the policy decisions
which formed the basis for the illegal acts.285
The Supreme Court also used a policy analysis to define the
contours of vicarious antitrust liability in American Society of
Mechanical Engineers.2 s In holding that vicarious liability would
be imposed even in the absence of actual authority, the Court
noted that the threat to competition arose from the mere appear-
ance of authority.8 7 As the Court explained, "[w]hen [the organi-
zation] cloaks its subcommittee officials with the authority of its
reputation, [it] permits those agents to affect the destinies of busi-
nesses and thus gives them the power to frustrate competition in
the marketplace. 2 8 8 Therefore, the acts of agents with apparent
authority pose just as serious a threat to competition as acts of
agents with actual authority. Similarly, the Court held that it was
irrelevant that the agents did not intend to benefit the organiza-
tion, because the threat to competition did not depend on which
party the agents intended to benefit. 89 In fact, the greatest threat
within a complex business organization. Id. Second, punishment of individuals
will not necessarily deter future violations by their employer. Id.
283. Id. at 1006. See also American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 102 S. Ct. at
1945 ("But if, in addition, ASME is civilly liable for the antitrust violations of its
agents acting with apparent authority, it is much more likely that similar anti-
trust violations will not occur in the future."). Moreover, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the defendant organization is in the best position to prevent future
violations by its agents. Id. at 1945-46, 1948 n.15.
284. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d at 1006.
285. Id.
286. 102 S. Ct. at 1944-48. As a matter of antitrust policy, the imposition of
vicarious antitrust liability was justified by the facts of that case, in which the
dominant manufacturer in the industry used the nonprofit organization to destroy
an aggressive competitor which had developed an innovative product. Id. at 1939-
41.
287. Id. at 1944. See also id. at 1946 ("ASME's agents exercise economic
power because they act with the force of the Society's reputation behind them.").
The Court also noted that such standard-setting organizations possess great eco-
nomic power and involve a serious danger of restraining trade. Id. at 1944-45.
288. Id. at 1944.
289. Id. at 1946.
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is posed by agents with apparent authority who have ulterior mo-
tives.2" Finally, the Court reasoned that liability could be imposed
even without ratification by the principal, because a requirement
of ratification would encourage ignorance by the principal, and,
thereby, make violations more likely.291
The procompetitive policies of the antitrust laws will also de-
termine the ways in which vicarious antitrust liability will be ap-
plied to the health care field. For example, courts will be more will-
ing to impose vicarious antitrust liability in the health care field in
those situations where deterrence appears to be most necessary
and effective.292 Vicarious antitrust liability is also likely to be im-
posed in the health care field where the hospital entity reaped the
profits of the violation, or where there is a strong suspicion of
administration or governing board knowledge of the agent's viola-
tion."9 Finally, vicarious liability will be imposed in the health
care field where the threat to competition from the agent's viola-
tion is just as serious as if the violation had been committed by the
hospital itself."5
The United States Supreme Court has also indicated that a
private antitrust action for vicarious liability should be evaluated
under the standards used for analogous tort actions. 2" In tort ac-
tions in the health care field, there is widespread liability for the
acts of agents and a frequent expansion of agency relationships to
permit an injured person to recover. In addition, there has been a
great increase in the number and variety of non-employed physi-
cians who are held to be agents of the hospital. Therefore, if courts
considering vicarious antitrust liability in the health care field
analogize to health care negligence actions, then health care prov-
iders will often be held vicariously liable under the antitrust laws
for the acts of their agents, because courts have been expansive in
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
296. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 102 S. Ct. at 1944. "In this case,
we can honor the statutory purpose best by interpreting the antitrust private
cause of action to be at least as broad as a plaintiff's right to sue for analogous
torts, absent indications that the antitrust laws are not intended to reach so far."
Id. See also id. at 1942 (discussing torts analogous to antitrust violations, includ-
ing fraud, misrepresentation, defamation and tortious interference with business
relations).
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finding agency relationships in the health care field and because
health care institutions have so many agents.
In addition to the policy reasons for imposing vicarious anti-
trust liability in the health care field, a prediction of vicarious anti-
trust liability can be made on the basis of certain fact patterns.
Specifically, the scope of vicarious antitrust liability in the health
care field can be defined to encompass those anticompetitive situa-
tions in which there is no independent basis for hospital liability.
If the hospital is the responsible decision-maker or a conspirator in
its own right, then it will be unnecessary for antitrust plaintiffs to
rely on a theory of vicarious liability. For example, in matters in-
volving a hospital's denial of staff privileges, there will be no need
for a plaintiff to rely on vicarious liability, because the hospital
entity is already the responsible decision-maker in its own right.""
Similarly, it will be unnecessary to apply vicarious liability where
the hospital entity is alleged to have conspired with other hospi-
tals, planning agencies or third party payors."" Finally, vicarious
liability will be inapplicable where a hospital conspires with mem-
bers of its own medical staff. Although a hospital and its medical
staff are merely parts of a unified entity,2" with the staff acting as
agent of the hospital, 00 at least one court has explicitly held that a
hospital can conspire with a member of its own medical staff,
thereby creating a conspiracy between two separate entities for an-
titrust purposes.3 " In that case, the director of the hospital's sur-
gery department was acting as agent of the hospital in considering
his competitor's application for staff privileges, but he also had "an
independent, personal stake in achieving the object of the conspir-
acy. 30 2 Where the hospital conspires with one or more members of
297. See supra notes 113-18, 139 and accompanying text.
298. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740
(1976) (allegations that defendant hospital, its administrator, and one of its trust-
ees conspired with unrelated parties, including the head of the local planning
agency).
299. See supra notes 126-27, 144-45 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
301. Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 907 (W.D. Pa. 981), aff'd, 688
F.2d. 824, (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 302 (1982). See supra note 245.
The district court also held that a hospital or its agents is legally capable of
conspiring with a professional association of physicians which provides services at
the hospital. 521 F. Supp. at 906. But see Sokol v. University Hosp., Inc., 402 F.
Supp. 1029, 1030 (D. Mass. 1975) (joint action by personnel of a hospital is not an
antitrust conspiracy).
302. Robinson, 521 F. Supp. at 907. As the court explained,
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its medical staff, it is unnecessary to attempt to impose vicarious
antitrust liability. However, where the hospital is neither the re-
sponsible decision-maker nor a conspirator in its own right, an an-
titrust plaintiff will seek to rely on vicarious antitrust liability, just
as a malpractice plaintiff will seek to rely on vicarious negligence
liability when there is no violation of duty by the hospital itself. In
addition, plaintiffs may begin to plead vicarious antitrust liability
as an alternative basis of liability in their antitrust complaints in
the health care field.
B. Practical Application of Vicarious Antitrust Liability in the
Health Care Field: Claims, Defenses and Preventive Measures
The Supreme Court's analysis in American Society of
Mechanical Engineers3 0 3 is directly applicable to standard-setting
organizations in the health care field, such as the Joint Commis-
sion on Accreditation of Hospitals.304 More importantly, the
Court's analysis may be applied to impose vicarious antitrust lia-
bility on a hospital for the acts of non-employed physicians. In
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the Court held that
vicarious antitrust liability could be imposed upon a nonprofit cor-
poration for the acts of its non-employed agents acting with appar-
ent authority, even though the agents were not acting to benefit
the corporation.30 ' Therefore, in the health care context, health
[c]ourts have recognized a narrow exception to the general rule that no
violation occurs when a corporation conspires only with its officers,
agents or employees. This exception provides that a violation can occur if
the officer, agent or employee has an independent, personal stake in
achieving the object of the conspiracy.
Id. See also Note, "Conspiring Entities" Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 95
HAXv. L. Riv. 661, 676 (1982) ("The [Supreme] Court has held that an outside
contractor, such as a management consultant, may be found to have conspired
with his principal firm if the contractor has an independent economic interest in
the alleged restraint of trade.") (footnote omitted) (citing Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S.
464, 469-70 (1962)). But see International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Air-
lines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980) (conspiracy
existed between airline and its advertising agency, where agency materially aided
airline's anticompetitive plan with knowledge of its purpose). See generally Han-
dler & Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3
CARDozo L. REv. 23 (1981).
303. See supra notes 268-75, 286-91 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
305. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 102 S. Ct. 1935, 1946-48 (1982).
See supra notes 268-75 and accompanying text.
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care institutions may be subject to treble damage liability for the
concerted anticompetitive activities of non-employed medical staff
members, as the actual or apparent agents of the hospital.
In identifying potential applications of vicarious antitrust lia-
bility in the health care field, potential antitrust plaintiffs are not
limited to the aggrieved competitors of the hospital or its medical
staff members. Rather, potential plaintiffs include anyone who is
injured in his business or property by a violation of the antitrust
laws, 3  including patients30 7 and producers of health care prod-
ucts. 30 8 In addition, federal and state agencies have enforcement
powers in both civil and criminal arenas.0 9
The clearest health care analogy to American Society of
Mechanical Engineerss10 is the situation in which members of a
hospital's medical staff make a public statement which injures a
competitor. For example, the medical staff of a hospital, in pursuit
of its authority to maintain the quality of patient care and regulate
the ethical practices of its members,"'1 might make a public com-
munication which is highly critical of a new provider in the mar-
ketplace, such as an ambulatory surgical center, emergency medi-
cal treatment center, or health maintenance organization. A similar
situation arose in Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mo-
hammad.3 2 In Mohammad, six of the defendants were physicians
on the obstetrics and gynecology staff of a particular hospital.313 In
addition to individual or collective refusals by the six physicians to
deal with the new health center, the obstetrics and gynecology staff
adopted a resolution and voted to send out a letter concerning the
new health center.814 If such communications had been dissemi-
306. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V 1981).
307. See McCready v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).
308. See infra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
309. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-15 (1981).
310. See supra note 305.
311. See generally JCAH, supra note 98, at 93.
312. 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
313. Id. at 535.
314. Id. at 536-38. As the court explained, the staff "adopted a resolution
that it would not 'approve' the [plaintiff] Center if no member of the hospital
staff were associated with the Center." Id. at 536. In addition, the staff voted to
send a letter to the medical society arguing against association with providers that
advertise. Id. at 537. Because the six physicians were acting in their role as the
hospital's staff, they were probably acting as agents of the hospital. However,
even if they exceeded their actual authority as agents of the hospital, the public
would have perceived them to be acting with the apparent authority of the
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nated to the general public, either stating or implying that the new
competitor provided unsafe medical services, the new competitor
could have been seriously injured in the marketplace. Moreover,
because that type of statement by the medical staff would appear
to carry the imprimatur of the hospital entity, the hospital might
be held vicariously liable under the antitrust laws on a theory of
apparent authority. Just as in American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, "[w]hen [the hospital] cloaks its [medical staff] with
the authority of its reputation, [it] permits those agents to affect
the destinies of businesses and thus gives them the power to frus-
trate competition in the marketplace. '"'5 Similarly, if a research
center or medical school published a negative report about a drug
or medical device, as a result of a conspiracy between the individ-
ual researcher and a supplier of competing products, then the in-
stitution might be held vicariously liable for the act of its dishon-
est agent.316 Even if the institution had no knowledge of its
researcher's conspiracy, the institution might be held vicariously
liable on a theory of apparent authority.3 17 Finally, if medical staff
members agree among themselves to furnish untruthful negative
references about a former colleague or hospital employee, the hos-
pital might be held vicariously liable for the concerted anticompe-
titive communications. In such a case, the plaintiff would contend
that the adverse references were given by the staff members in
their roles as agents of the hospital, or, at least, appeared to be
backed by the prestigious reputation of the hospital. As the Su-
preme Court indicated in American Society of Mechanical Engi-
neers, vicarious antitrust liability will be imposed where the threat
hospital.
315. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 102 S. Ct. at 1944.
316. A similar prospect was suggested by the dissent in American Soc'y of
Mechanical Eng'rs, 102 S. Ct. at 1956 (Powell, J., dissenting). As the dissent
explained,
the Court has devised what amounts to a rule of strict liability for volun-
tary associations in antitrust cases .... [I]f a private pharmaceutical
school-a tax-exempt corporation like ASME-released a study con-
demning a particular drug, because a competing drug company had sub-
orned the professor who wrote the report, the Court's rule would subject
the school to the full brunt of treble damages.
Id.
317. See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 102 S. Ct. at 1946-48 (vicari-
ous antitrust liability can be imposed without ratification of the acts of the agents
with apparent authority). See supra notes 271, 291 and accompanying text.
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to competition arises from the mere appearance of authority."'
In response to allegations of vicarious antitrust liability, health
care institutions can raise several defenses. First, the institution
can answer that the members of its medical staff alleged to have
conspired were not its agents, because they were acting as individ-
ual physicians rather than as the institution's medical staff. Even if
the physicians were agents of the hospital, the hospital can answer
that the physicians were neither acting within the scope of their
employment nor acting with apparent authority. 31 9 In response to
allegations of injurious anticompetitive communications, the hospi-
tal can also raise the Noerr-Pennington defense of first amend-
ment protection for joint activity to influence governmental ac-
tion. 320 For example, if the plaintiff complains about a public
statement that questioned the safety of its services, defendant can
answer that the statements were part of a publicity campaign to
influence governmental action against the plaintiff.2 ' A third de-
fense to allegations of vicarious antitrust liability is that the medi-
cal staff was attempting in good faith to interpret and apply a
health or safety standard.2 2 In American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, the Court noted that, "we do not face a challenge to a
good faith interpretation of an ASME code reasonably supported
by health or safety considerations. 3 23 Apparently, such a good
318. See sup ra note 287 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 265-71, 279 and accompanying text. In cases of appar-
ent authority, the hospital can also respond that any injury suffered by the plain-
tiff as a result of an injurious publication was proximately caused by the physi-
cians' individual reputations, rather than by the reputation of the hospital.
320. See supra notes 212-21 and accompanying text. Although the court in
Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 542-44 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979) restricted the Noerr-Pennington de-
fense to direct communications to solicit governmental action, Noerr itself in-
volved a broader publicity compaign including speeches, articles, and editorials to
encourage governmental action against competitors. Eastern R.R. Presidents Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1961). However, the
publicity campaign in Noerr would have violated the antitrust laws if it had been
a direct attempt to dissuade customers from dealing with competitors. See id. at
142. Therefore, Noerr-Pennington immunity depends upon the goal of the com-
munication rather than the immediate recipient of the communication. The court
in Mohammad apparently reached the correct result in denying Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity, because the communications encouraged a concerted refusal to
deal rather than governmental action. See supra note 314.
321. See supra note 320.
322. See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 102 S. Ct. at 1948.
323. Id. (citing Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963)). See
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faith interpretation would have been a successful defense in that
case, although the precise contours of that defense are unclear.
Thus, if a hospital is alleged to be vicariously liable for the injuri-
ous statement of its agents, the hospital can raise its agents' good
faith as a defense.
There are practical steps which hospitals can take to reduce
the risk of vicarious antitrust liability. If the medical staff or its
members publishes a statement which is injurious to a competitor
or supplier, 24 the hospital should promptly issue a public dis-
claimer. In American Society of Mechanical Engineers,8 8 Chief
Justice Burger concurred in the judgment of the Court on the
grounds that the nonprofit organization ratified the anticompeti-
tive conduct of its agents and failed to disavow that conduct32
Even though the opinion of the Court in American Society of
Mechanical Engineers makes ratification irrelevant for purposes of
liability, 27 an effective disclaimer by a hospital should minimize
the damages suffered by a plaintiff. Therefore, a hospital should
promptly clarify that the statements of the medical staff or its
members do not represent the position of the hospital. This will
require vigilance in monitoring all statements which appear to be
made on behalf of the hospital, as well as all other potentially an-
ticompetitive actions of the medical staff. Although such extensive
control over physicians may seem impractical, it is merely part of
an historical progression toward greater hospital control of physi-
cians.8"' As discussed above, the imposition of greater negligence
liability on hospitals has caused hospitals to protect themselves by
exercising greater control over the activities of their staff physi-
cians.3 2 9 Similarly, the threat of vicarious antitrust liability will re-
quire and enable the hospital to assert greater control over its staff
physicians, in order to comply with its responsibilities and protect
supra notes 200-11 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 310-15 and accompanying text.
325. 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982).
326. Id. at 1948 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment). As the Chief Jus-
tice explained, "I agree with the result reached since Petitioner [ASME] permit-
ted itself to be used to further the scheme which caused injury to respondent. At
no time did petitioner disavow the challenged conduct of its members who mis-
used their positions in the Society." Id.
327. See supra note 291 and accompanying text. In fact, the dissenting jus-
tices concluded that the majority's opinion creates a rule of strict liability. 102 S.
Ct. at 1956 (Powell, J., dissenting).
328. See supra notes 26-28, 122-24 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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itself against liabilities.330
VI. CONCLUSION
The formal rule structure for vicarious hospital liability, which
was created to compensate negligently injured patients, now
threatens to spill over into areas other than negligence. One exam-
ple is vicarious antitrust liability for the acts of non-employed phy-
sicians. Another example is vicarious liability for sexual harrass-
ment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3"1 Under the
Final Interpretive Guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission,3 ' a hospital will be liable for sexual harrassment
by its supervisors and agents, even without knowledge or negli-
gence by the hospital.33 3 If a non-employed member of the medical
staff harrasses a hospital nurse, the nurse could seek to hold the
hospital vicariously liable on the ground that the physician was an
agent of the hospital. The hospital would answer that it is not re-
sponsible for the acts of an independent contractor physician; but
this defense has been severely eroded in the negligence field, and it
may become equally ineffective in fields other than negligence.
Other examples will surely arise in the near future. Thus, in order
to protect themselves, hospitals must monitor the non-medical ac-
tivities of their medical staff members, which will cause further
changes in the relationship between the hospital and its staff
physicians.
330. In American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, the Court emphasized that the
nonprofit organization has now asserted greater control over the process of inter-
preting its standards. 102 S. Ct. at 1947 n.15. "Apparently, ASME now gives its
interpretations close scrutiny through the publication process." Id. at 1948 n.15.
331. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
332. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1981).
333. Id. at § 1604.11. "The Commission will examine the circumstances of
the particular employment relationship and the job junctions [sic] performed by
the individual in determining whether an individual acts in either a supervisory or
agency capacity." Id.
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